“Man cannot control the current of events,” said Germany’s 19th-century Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, “he can only float with them and steer.” Bismarck had what geopolitical theorist Halford Mackinder thought was the most important quality of a statesman: “Insight into the minds of other nations than his own.” Historian A.J.P. Taylor said Bismarck’s greatest legacy was realpolitik. German-American historian Hajo Holborn wrote that he had an “uncanny genius for making conflicting state interests serve the stability of peace.” Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger lauded Bismarck’s possession of “an extraordinary sense of proportion which turned power into an instrument of self-restraint” and his “ability to exploit every available option without the constraint of ideology.” The Biden administration has left Donald Trump with a world of crises to deal with in his second term. War continues to rage in Ukraine. The much-touted Middle East ceasefire is falling apart. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have moved closer together in opposition to the United States. China’s relative power in the Indo-Pacific has increased vis-à-vis the United States and its allies. The humiliation of Afghanistan and Biden’s inability to deter Russia from invading Ukraine have undermined America’s deterrent posture globally. The Monroe Doctrine is withering on the vine in the face of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and America’s unimpressive response to China’s inroads in Latin America. China’s aggressive moves in the South China Sea have become normalized. (READ MORE: Rejuvenating the Monroe Doctrine) Trump’s incoming national security team better start reading up on Bismarck. They could start with A.J.P. Taylor’s Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman, then follow that up with Taylor’s chapters on Bismarck in his masterful The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918, Jonathan Steinberg’s Bismarck: A Life, Kissinger’s chapter on Bismarck in Diplomacy, Holborn’s chapters on Bismarck in his magisterial A History of Modern Germany, and perhaps even delve into Bismarck’s memoirs, which like all memoirs are somewhat self-serving. Bismarck is the antidote to the folly of decades of U.S. neoconservative adventurism and interventionism. Trump’s foreign policy instincts appear Bismarckian. He campaigned in 2016 on putting an end to the endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and moved in that direction as president. He sought to improve relations with Russia after two decades of American hubris that helped to revive the worst aspects of Russian nationalism and imperialism but was sidetracked in that effort by the Democrats’ Russia hoax. Trump shifted America’s strategic focus from small, peripheral conflicts to great power challenges, especially from China. He recognized that the Indo-Pacific was more important to U.S. security in the 21st century than Europe. He improved our security relationship with Japan and India in the face of aggressive moves by China. He even reached out to the North Korean regime in an effort to stabilize the Korean peninsula. And toward the end of his first term, Trump began a whole-of-government approach to the global geopolitical challenge posed by China. Like Bismarck, Trump is devoid of ideology and understands that sentiment cannot guide policy in this dangerous world. He eschewed nation-building and efforts to promote democracy abroad. Like Bismarck, Trump is a “deal maker,” willing to make whatever deals enhance the security of his country and promote his country’s interests. And, Trump, like Bismarck, is a nationalist who is unafraid to offend “world opinion” by putting his country “first” in conducting diplomacy, negotiating trade deals, imposing and threatening to impose tariffs, forming alliances, and shifting alliances when necessary to promote American interests. Trump’s instincts need to be translated into policy by a team of foreign policy realists who share his America First agenda. The national security bureaucracy, the foreign policy establishment, and the military-industrial complex will fight these efforts to redefine America’s interests and reshape its diplomacy.  Trump’s Bismarckians will need to be adept at bureaucratic maneuvering and policy manipulation. Trump’s team would be wise to study the methods by which President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger managed to centralize the conduct of foreign policy in the White House. Nixon and Kissinger were able to pull off “triangular diplomacy,” end the Vietnam War, bring peace to the Middle East, improve relations with independent communist countries, and generally promote American interests until Nixon’s enemies in the Democratic Party, the media, the military-industrial complex, and what we now know as the “deep state” put an end to his presidency over the Watergate break-in. Trump surely knows what lengths the permanent bureaucracy will go to undermine a presidency. Trump’s Bismarckians above all will need to have a sense of the limits of American power, a trait that has been severely lacking in our foreign policy/defense bureaucracy since the end of the Cold War. He needs to not only choose wisely the people who will sit atop the bureaucracies, but also the deputy secretaries, assistant secretaries, and others who will be tasked to implement his foreign policies. He needs, in short, a team of Bismarckians. Trump’s instincts need to be translated into policy by a team of foreign policy realists who share his America First agenda. READ MORE from Francis P. Sempa: Rejuvenating the Monroe Doctrine Is Biden Trying to Start World War III Before Trump Takes Office? James Burnham: the Sage of Kent, Connecticut The post Trump Needs ‘Bismarcks’ to Steer Our Foreign Policy appeared first on The American Spectator | USA News and Politics.