There is no emergency justifying the rushed process. An immediate pause and a slow and deliberative process would lead to better policy development and deliver better national and global health policy outcomes. On 11 March, my article criticising what appeared to be a slow-motion coup d’état by the World Health Organisation (WHO) to seize health powers from states in the name of preparing for, conducting early warning surveillance of, and responding to “public health emergencies of international [and regional] concern” was published in the Australian. The coup was in the form of a new pandemic treaty and an extensive package of more than 300 amendments to the existing International Health Regulations (IHR) that was signed in 2005 and came into force in 2007, together referred to as the WHO pandemic accords. The two sets of changes to the architecture of global health governance, I argued, will effectively change the WHO from a technical advisory organisation offering recommendations into a supranational public health authority telling governments what to do. On 3 May, the Australian published a reply by Dr. Ashley Bloomfield, co-chair of the WHO working group on the IHR amendments. Bloomfield was New Zealand’s Director-General of Health from 2018–22 and received a knighthood for his services in the 2024 New Year’s Honours list. His engagement with the public debate is very welcome. Rejecting the charge that the WHO is engaged in a power grab over states, Bloomfield wrote that as a one-time senior UN official, I “would know that no single member state is going to concede sovereignty, let alone the entire 194 members.” I bow to the good doctor’s superior medical knowledge in comparison to my non-existent medical qualifications.Save 40% on our limited edition Brain Force Ultra that’s loaded with proprietary super ingredients! Unfortunately, I cannot say the same with respect to reforms across the UN system, or sovereignty, or the relationship between “We the peoples” (the first three words of the UN Charter), on the one hand, and UN entities as agents in the service of the peoples, on the other. On medical and not health policy issues, I would quickly find myself out of my depth. I respectfully submit that on sovereignty concerns, Dr. Ashley may be the one out of his depth. On the first point, I was seconded to the UN Secretariat as the senior adviser to Kofi Annan on UN reforms and wrote his second reform report that covered the entire UN system: Strengthening the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change (2002). The topic of UN reforms, both the case for it and the institutional and political obstacles frustrating the achievement of the most critical reforms, forms a core chapter of my book The United Nations, Peace and Security (Cambridge University Press, 2006, with a substantially revised second edition published in 2017). I was also involved in a small Canada-based group that advocated successfully for the elevation of the G20 finance ministers’ group into a leaders’ level group that could serve as an informal grouping for brokering agreements on global challenges, including pandemics, nuclear threats, terrorism, and financial crises. I co-wrote the book The Group of Twenty (G20) (Routledge, 2012) with Andrew F. Cooper, a colleague in that project. On the second point, I played a central role in the UN’s reconceptualisation of sovereignty as state responsibility and citizens as rights holders. This was unanimously endorsed by world leaders at the UN summit in 2005.  On the third point, in Utopia Lost: The United Nations and World Order (1995), Rosemary Righter (the former chief leader writer at the Times of London) quoted Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s description of the United Nations as “a place where the peoples of the world were delivered up to the designs of governments” (p. 85). So yes, I do indeed know something about UN system reforms and the importance of sovereignty concerns in relation to powers given to UN bodies to prescribe what states may and may not do. In agreeing to undertake to implement the WHO advisories, states will be creating a new system of pandemic management under the WHO authority and binding under international law. It will create an open-ended international law obligation to cooperate with the WHO and to fund it. This is the same WHO that has a track record of incompetence, poor decision-making, and politicised conduct. The insistence that sovereignty is not being surrendered is formulaic and legalistic, not substantive and meaningful in practice. It relies on a familiar technique of gaslighting that permits plausible deniability on both sides. The WHO will say it only issued advisories. States will say they are only implementing WHO recommendations as otherwise, they will become rogue international outlaws. The resulting structure of decision-making effectively confers powers without responsibility on the WHO while shredding accountability of governments to their electorates. The losers are the peoples of the world. A “Litany of Lies” and Misconceptions? Not So Fast. Bloomfield’s engagement with the public debate on the WHO-centric architecture of global health governance is very welcome. I have lauded the WHO’s past impressive achievements in earlier writings, for example in the co-written book Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey (Indiana University Press, 2010). I also agree wholeheartedly that it continues to do a lot of good work, 24/7. In early 2020 I fought with a US editor to reject a reference to the possible virus escape from the Wuhan lab because of WHO’s emphatic statements to the contrary. I later apologised to him for my naivete. Once betrayed, twice shy of the message: “Trust us. We are from the WHO, here to keep you safe.” Sir Ashley was merely echoing the WHO chief. Addressing the World Governments Summit in Dubai on 12 February, Director-General (DG) Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus attacked “the litany of lies and conspiracy theories” about the agreement that “are utterly, completely, categorically false. The pandemic agreement will not give WHO any power over any state or any individual.” DG Tedros and Sir Ashley do protest too much. If Australia chooses as a sovereign nation to sign them, that does not mean there is no loss of effective sovereignty (that is, the power to make its health decisions) from that point on. This is why all 49 Republican senators have “strongly” urged President Joe Biden to reject the proposed changes. The expansion of “WHO’s authority over member states during” pandemic emergencies, they warn, would “constitute intolerable infringements upon US sovereignty.” In addition, 22 Attorneys-General have informed Biden that the WHO writ under the new accords will not run in their states. On 8 May, the UK said it would not sign the new treaty unless clauses requiring transfer of pandemic products were deleted. Under Article 12.6.b of the then-draft, the WHO could sign “legally binding” contracts with manufacturers to get pandemic-related “diagnostics, therapeutics or vaccines.” Ten percent of this is to be free of charge and another ten percent at profit-free prices. In the latest, 22 April draft, this last requirement comes in Article 12.3.b.i in slightly softer language. The UK wants to retain the right to use British-made products first to address domestic requirements as judged by the government, and only then to make them available for global distribution. The draft, the government fears, will undermine British sovereignty. On 14 May, five senators and nine representatives from the Australian parliament wrote a formal letter to PM Anthony Albanese expressing deep concern over the likely prospect of Australia signing the accords that “will transform the WHO from an advisory organisation to a supranational health authority dictating how governments must respond to emergencies which the WHO itself declares.” If adopted and implemented into Australian law, they wrote, these would give the WHO “an unacceptable level of authority, power and influence over Australia’s affairs under the guise of declaring ‘emergencies’.” “Legally Binding” vs “Loss of Sovereignty” is a Distinction without a Difference They can’t all be part of a global conspiracy to peddle a litany of lies. The WHO is offering up a highly specious argument. Sir Ashley didn’t really engage with the substance of my arguments either. He dismissed criticism of the proposed changes as “an attempt by the WHO to gain the power to dictate to countries what they must do in the event of a pandemic” as a “misconception.” The G20 Leaders’ Bali Declaration (November 2022, paragraph 19) supported the goal of a “legally binding instrument that should contain both legally binding and non-legally binding elements to strengthen pandemic planning, preparedness and response (PPR) and amendments to the IHR.” In September 2023, the G20 Delhi Leaders’ Declaration (28:vi) envisioned “an ambitious, legally binding WHO” accord “as well as amendments to better implement” the IHR. Lawrence Gostin, actively involved in the negotiations, was co-author of a report last December that said containing transnational outbreaks under WHO leadership “may require all states to forgo some level of sovereignty.” A joint Reuters-World Economic Forum article on 26 May 2023 stated: “For the new more wide-reaching pandemic accord, member states have agreed that it should be legally binding.”  The WHO itself describes the IHR as “an instrument of international law that is legally-binding on 196 countries.” Last year it published a document that includes section 4.6 on “legally binding international instruments” such as a new pandemic accord. I get the argument that sovereign states are voluntarily agreeing to this. In terms of legal technicality, it might well be more accurate, as Libby Klein suggests in her draft letter to Australian MPs, to use words and phrases like “ceding autonomy,” “yielding “effective control over public health decisions,” “outsourcing public health decision-making to the WHO,” or “offshoring our public health decision-making.” This is the legalistic distinction that Bloomfield is effectively making. However, simply because states must voluntarily sign the new WHO accords doesn’t mean they will not be ceding sovereignty once the accords are adopted. With all due respect to Dr. Tedros and Sir Ashley, this is a distinction without a difference. Every single “legally binding” requirement will mean a transfer of effective decision-making power on health issues to the WHO. That is a curtailment of state sovereignty and it is disingenuous to deny it. Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, states have been required to conduct themselves increasingly in conformity with international standards. And it is the UN system that sets most of the relevant international standards and benchmarks of state behaviour. For example, for centuries countries had the absolute right to wage wars of aggression and defence as an acknowledged and accepted attribute of sovereignty. By adopting the United Nations Charter in 1945, they gave up the right to wage aggressive wars. I am very glad they did so. Just because the surrender of this aspect of sovereignty was voluntary, it doesn’t mean there was no surrender of sovereignty. Similarly, by signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), Australia and around 185 states surrendered their sovereign right to make or get the nuclear bomb. Again, I am very glad they did so. Article 10 of the treaty does permit withdrawal after a three-month notice to other states parties and the UN Security Council: Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treatyif it decides that extraordinary events…have jeopardisedthe supreme interests of its country. Australia could still act as a sovereign state and pull out of the NPT but, absent exculpatory events, only at the reputational cost of acting illegally under international law. North Korea first announced withdrawal from the NPT in 1993, suspended the withdrawal, withdrew in 2003, has conducted six nuclear tests since 2006, and acquired up to 50 bombs. Yet, the UN has refused to accept the withdrawal and it is still listed on the UN website as an NPT member, with the explanatory note that: “States parties to the Treaty continue to express divergent views regarding the status of the DPRK under the NPT.”  Like these two important examples, states will lose key parts of the right to exercise their sovereignty over national policy settings and decisions on health if the WHO accords are adopted. It is their sovereign right to reject the treaties now. They should exercise it before it is too late. The complications entangling the post-Brexit referendum in the UK demonstrate only too vividly how challenging it can be for a state to extricate itself from a supranational authority despite the sovereign right to do so. The best way to allay these fears and concerns would be to return responsibility to where accountability lies: with the national government and parliament. States should learn to cooperate better in global pandemic management, not hand effective decision-making powers and authority to unelected and unaccountable international technocrats. The Effort Should Be Put on Indefinite Hold It is an iron law of politics that any power that can be abused, will be abused by someone, somewhere, some time in the future. For current examples of overreach by a technocrat, look no further than Australia’s eSafety Commissioner. The truly frightening thing about her example is the realisation of just how much her efforts have been deliberately embedded in a global campaign to “bureaucratise” and control the internet. A softer conclusion is that powers once granted over citizens to authorities are far more difficult to claw back than not giving them the powers in the first place. Thus far from retreating, the Censorship-Industrial Complex is simultaneously being broadened to embrace additional sectors of governance and public policy and globalised. A report from Leeds University documented that pandemics are rare events. They are not becoming more frequent. For poor countries, their global disease burden is much lower than that of the big killer diseases like TB, malaria, and HIV/AIDS. For industrialised countries like Australia, the disease burden has been greatly reduced since the Spanish flu with improved surveillance, response mechanism, and other public health interventions. There is no emergency justifying the rushed process. An immediate pause and a slow and deliberative process would lead to better policy development and deliver better national and global health policy outcomes.  “Pause for thought, argue for a wider delay, think it through properly. And don’t sign till it’s right.” David Frost, who led the UK Brexit negotiations. Just so. EMERGENCY FINANCIAL NEWS: Economist Warns The Collapse Has Already Begun – Will Be Worse Than The Great Depression

"A just war exists when a people tries to ward off the threat of coercive domination by another people, or to overthrow an already-existing domination." Most modern aspects of just war theory found in the West can be traced to Saint Augustine of Hippo, and later specified by Saint Thomas Aquinas. The basic purpose of this theory was to teach Christians, and other just rulers, that waging war in general was not sinful if war was waged under certain circumstances for certain moral purposes. This theory is broken down into two parts. First is the right to go to war, and second is how states are to act during war. The principles of just war theory have been the underlying justifications for many modern conflicts, even if not acknowledged explicitly. This examination of just war theory is not meant to oppose violent conflict in its entirety, or to necessarily oppose the ideals set out by just war theory. Instead, it is meant to demonstrate how just war theory has become a scapegoat for state actors as they seek to gain approval. Rather than ensuring that governments only participate in just conflicts, it has given governments a green light to participate in any war, as long as they can make the public believe that the conflict falls roughly into the requirements set by the just war theory. The requirements for how combatants act during the conflict may be an exception to this, as the public is often either unaware of the actions taking place or is aware via photos and video clips. However, warring governments are usually able to point to the necessity or morality of the war to justify any violations during the war itself. The competent authority requirement seems to be one of the more subjective points in the theory. Aquinas in Summa theologiae II-II focused on the legitimacy behind the declaration of war itself. As an example, a sovereign must declare war, not a private individual. It is important to note that sovereigns during Aquinas’s time acted similarly to private persons in that they had authority over their realm if their subjects and noblemen were happy, rather than a system where a government has power indefinitely, with regular elections providing the illusion of choice. Additionally, sovereigns at the time were directly responsible for their realm as it was their property; thus, wars declared had the potential to greatly affect the sovereign’s personal finances. The point however is problematic due to differing definitions and theories of individual and natural rights that would supersede the rights of sovereigns in modern-day states. Because of tricky definitions, this requirement may mean that a group is never justified in violent resistance. After all, what defines a nation? Surely Kosovo is a nation at this point, even though the United Nations has not awarded it with this status. What about groups that existed before the United Nations? Hungary was surely a nation, even when it was dominated by the Austrian Habsburgs. Did a nation only exist if they had a king? An argument can surely be made that the Jews resisting during World War II made up a nation of sorts, but with no sovereign. The Czechs and Poles had fighting regiments, but their states were overtaken by the Axis and Soviet powers. Their governments in exile existed out of necessity, not with a popular vote or regular elections. The British assisting the Czechs and Poles may have been fighting a just war, but were the resisting Czechs and Poles? Wars of resistance must be admissible if violent force in general is, but they find no room in just war theory. A possible update to this point could change it to require that wars must be fought not by dictators, but by elected leaders. This is easy for a state to ignore, unfortunately, as almost every state has policies that allow for increased power for the executive during times of emergency or war. This starts a pattern of the state ignoring requirements when convenient.Power up with Nitric Boost that’s now 40% OFF! This potent formula gives you the massive edge in strength and superior circulation for that unparalleled performance you've been looking for! The probability of success requirement is a tricky point as well. First, one must measure it morally. Should any state that will certainly lose resist going to war to regain lost territory or to rescue hostages? What of purely defensive struggles? Should a state give up as soon as it is clear that it has no chance against an invading enemy? Surely a defense cannot be labeled as unjust simply because it is a lost cause. When looking at this through a modern lens, this requirement may be extremely outdated and useless. All an executive must do is make a legislature believe that winning a war is possible, even if it is not. Additionally, war prospects often change or can fool military officials. The first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 certainly had the potential for a strong win from the Arab coalition. Fighters from seven Arab countries had a great shot at defeating Israel during this conflict. However, foreign arms shipments, among other factors, resulted in a largely favorable outcome for Israel. Similarly, in Vietnam, the United States Congress was assured that this conflict would be an easy win for the American-led coalition in South Vietnam. Predictably, however, intelligence reports were faulty, and Congress was misled. Both historically and logically, this requirement of just war theory has been less than useful. The last resort requirement is perhaps the most problematic point as there could always be another “last” resort after other options are tried. As states and elected officials usually need to look outwardly strong, they are less likely to offer satisfactory terms during negotiations if there is no threat of violence, or continued violence. A realist must understand that the threat of violence is the ultimate diplomatic tool, to be used often before serious nonviolent routes have been exhausted. This is of course not what is claimed by either side during conflict. Both sides are quick to point to supposed attempts at peace before a conflict is started. Additionally, states that are painted as the aggressor will never have truly exhausted diplomatic routes according to opposing state actors and major media outlets. This requirement of last resort will always be viewed, or painted, as respected by both sides, but it rarely is. It is, by definition, subjective, completely reliant on the strategic goals of each actor. The final requirement of this first part—the right to go to war—states that a just war must be fought over a just cause. The just cause point is easily manipulated by warmongers and the media that serve them. Saddam Hussein using chemical weapons or killing babies in hospitals was an easy story to tell, harder to prove, but it was hypothetically possible in the minds of Americans and thus did not have to be proven true. Similarly, Vladimir Putin attacking the virtuous Ukraine in a completely unprovoked fashion is easy to claim, but only when ignoring recent historical events. Even if the truth comes out, as has largely been the case for the Iraq War, consequences rarely come for the fabricators. As with all the previous requirements, organizations such as the United Nations in theory can ensure that state actors adhere to the just cause requirement. The unfortunate reality is that the UN is made of state actors who represent the strategic interests of their sender nations. The UN also has few enforcement mechanisms, and the permanent members of the Security Council can veto meaningful resolutions. The second part of the just war theory lists requirements on how states must act during the war and are all related. The distinction between combatants and civilians, the proportionality between civilian and military targets, the necessity of attacking militarily strategic targets, the fair treatment of prisoners of war, and the necessity to resist using methods that are considered evil are all principles that are easy to forget during the fog of war. Both sides are rarely equally accountable for infractions, with the winning side being almost always absolved from most of its infractions. This occurrence means that a side may violate the just war theory as long as it sufficiently increases the odds of winning. Rather than critiquing all the moral ideals found within just war theory, this observation was meant to point out how unrealistic, and historically ignored, these principles are. State actors will always justify conflict for their own benefit. Instead of giving such allowances to state actors, it would be wise to restrict their use of force to something much more measurable. One can look to Murray Rothbard for this: “A just war exists when a people tries to ward off the threat of coercive domination by another people, or to overthrow an already-existing domination. A war is unjust, on the other hand, when a people try to impose domination on another people or try to retain an already-existing coercive rule over them.“ EMERGENCY FINANCIAL NEWS: Economist Warns The Collapse Has Already Begun – Will Be Worse Than The Great Depression

by Jeff Thomas, International Man: Empires are built through the creation or acquisition of wealth. The Roman Empire came about through the productivity of its people and its subsequent acquisition of wealth from those that it invaded. The Spanish Empire began with productivity and expanded through the use of its large armada of ships, looting […]

from The Dan Bongino Show: TRUTH LIVES on at https://sgtreport.tv/

by Mike LaChance, The Gateway Pundit: Illegal immigrants are apparently paying attention to political poll numbers in the United States. Many of them are afraid that Trump is going to win in November and they’re rushing to the border as a result. They’re afraid that the free-for-all they have enjoyed under Biden will be all […]

from Dr. Jane Ruby: TRUTH LIVES on at https://sgtreport.tv/

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