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The Army stated Monday that 23 year-old Sergeant Quandarius Stanley recently died from injuries sustained in the construction of a floating pier off of the Gaza Strip. Stanley had served with the 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary), which is based out of Joint Base Langley-Eustis in Virginia. “Sgt Quandarius Stanley was an instrumental and well respected first line leader in the 7th Transportation Brigade Expeditionary (TBX), especially during the mission to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Gaza,” the commander of Stanley’s unit, Colonel John “Eddie” Gray, stated on Monday. “We will continue to provide support to his family during this difficult time. Our entire unit mourns alongside his family.” Stanley was one of three U.S. soldiers injured in the operation. The other two soldiers suffered only minor injuries and were immediately returned to duty. The three were injured in non-combat incidents. It is unclear how Stanley was injured. Stanley had been transferred in June to the Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio, and had been medically retired as his injuries precluded future military service.  The post U.S. Soldier Injured on Gaza Pier Mission Dies in Hospital appeared first on The American Conservative.

Foreign Affairs Can Badenoch Orient the UK Toward the Future? The new Tory leader is right about the past, but has yet to demonstrate an understanding of the core problems of the present. Credit: image via Shutterstock One laughs at the absurdity of modern politics, as Peter Hitchens once wrote in his beautiful essay on the making of a reactionary, watching “tiny figures scuttling through cavernous halls built for much greater men.” I’m not sure how tall Kemi Badenoch is—although I have seen her in person several times, and IMDb is not correct that she is 6 feet tall. But in selecting a black Briton to be leader for the first time, the British Conservatives changed the politics of a country now indistinguishable from the U.S. and the greater Anglosphere.  Badenoch, the face of modern post-imperial Britain, a native-born minority conservative in a host including Suella Braverman, Priti Patel, and Rishi Sunak, a warrior against woke, a Ron DeSantis superfan, will cast a very long shadow over the Number 10 Downing Street, which currently hosts a PM who once took a knee in support of Black Lives Matter and just surrendered the British territory of the Chagos islands to some Third-World hellhole.  Purely from a sense of fair play, it is unsporting and perhaps unwise to judge Badenoch before she gets a chance to play her hand. I made no qualms about my support for Braverman, whom I still consider to be the smartest of the Conservative candidates and possibly will be, after Curzon, the best prime minister Britain never had. It was Braverman who understood the core problem with Britain. It’s not crime and mass migration; it’s subservience to the European Convention of Human Rights, which is tied around Britain like the chain binding Fenrir. Remove that, and the state can once again be truly democratic and free to take action against criminals within and invaders from without. For as long as Britain is ensnared by a constantly morphing idea of human rights determined undemocratically by European liberals, nothing is going to change.  Yet we haven’t seen Badenoch talk much about that. Yes, she’s correct about the empire and colonialism. “I don’t care about colonialism because I know what we were doing before colonialism got there,” Badenoch was once reported to have said, adding correctly that prior to colonization there was never any concept of “rights”: “So those who lost out were old elites, not everyday people.” That is true. In her own words, there were terrible things during the empire, but also great things. Britain completely remade the modern world, from industry, to education and research, to common laws, archaeology, science, roads, steam engines, and railways, to fights against slavery and piracy, to destroying abhorrent social ills such as sati and the jizya. It was objectively the most liberal empire of all time. Any mention of that in history books is a taboo in modern Britain. So, in some ways, Badenoch is the first true face of post-imperial Britain.  But all that talk is irrelevant, because the maladies of Britain are not about how it views the past (although that is important in shaping the national narrative) but what is in store for the future. It is about tangible things, such as manufacturing, production capacity, military, higher education, housing, and healthcare. Britain has two perpetual core interests: to provide jobs and order within, and to promote a balance of power abroad, deterring any potential superstate next-door. The first interest is failing to be met due to the post-1945 elevation of human rights as a governing principle, the second because the British elite is internationalist to the point of self-loathing. Thus Britain has interestingly followed the trend of the greater Anglosphere, where native-born minorities have started to shift heavily to the right as a reaction to a section of native-born whites turning completely post-national.  Badenoch can change that if she truly cares. Britain provides her with an opportunity to share her narrative about state formation. Modern Britain’s situation is similar to its situation the on the cusp of the industrial revolution. It is not united, it has no singular narrative, it has faced nonsensical wars, and it is not free. All of that can be changed swiftly. The way forward is essentially following the template of the past, creating industries, deregulating, encouraging private enterprise, and creating a new national elite. If Badenoch is smart enough, she will try to untie the chains or regulation and human rights that currently bind her land. Order will provide jobs, which will provide housing and help families, which will in time create a new national story. The post Can Badenoch Orient the UK Toward the Future? appeared first on The American Conservative.

Politics This Time, Team Trump Wants Tariffs  Trump now has a pool of advisors and officials committed to enacting his economically nationalist policies. Credit: image via Shutterstock Economic nationalism has been a rhetorical pillar of the former president Donald Trump’s message since he first entered the 2016 race. His vision for trade and industrial policy overturned decades of GOP orthodoxy and won over millions of Americans left behind by globalization and deindustrialization. Yet, during his presidency, Trump struggled to enact economic nationalist policies, which conflicted with the entrenched economic views of his advisers, donors, and staff. As Trump makes trade protection a centerpiece of his 2024 platform, an uncomfortable question still lingers: Will his administration follow through? “Personnel is policy” is a mantra familiar to anyone privy to conversations about staffing the next Trump administration. This also extends to the people around Trump—his most trusted donors, informal advisors, etc.—who shape his priorities even if they are not appointees. Unlike before, Trump may very well have a growing circle of influential advisors and donors who share his vision for fair trade and reindustrialization. To evaluate the prospects for trade policy in a putative second Trump administration, we first must consider what transpired during Trump’s presidency. Of course, the administration successfully imposed massive tariffs on the People’s Republic of China, starting a trade war and effecting a historic shift in the U.S.-China relationship. Spearheaded by the highly capable U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and his well-aligned staff, the Trump trade policy has been one of the administration’s most enduring achievements. Along with Trump’s tariffs on steel, aluminum, and solar panels, the tariffs on China have been maintained, if amended, by the Biden administration. Many of Trump’s other goals for trade and industrial policy nevertheless went unfulfilled by the end of his term. A fifth column of free-market-fundamentalists and Never Trumpers in the congressional GOP had compromised the legislative potential of the 2017-19. During that critical period, Congress failed to take up Trump’s infrastructure proposals, ignored his call for anti-offshoring legislation, and instead approved a package of tax cuts with some merit but little to direct new growth towards fixed capital investment in manufacturing.  Congressional intransigence aside, other executive-led initiatives were not as successful as the Chinese tariffs. Reasonable tariffs on goods from the EU, which protects its own markets from U.S. exports, met with international controversy and eventual removal. Likewise, tariffs on Canada and Mexico amounted to very little. NAFTA’s replacement with the just marginally improved USMCA did not reverse the decades of damage inflicted by one of the worst trade deals in the history of trade deals. Infighting among senior administration officials over trade policy may have compromised the administration’s position in critical trade negotiations.  Perhaps because of these setbacks, Trump has redoubled his commitment to a tough trade policy on the 2024 campaign trail. He now promises to enact tariffs of 60 percent on Chinese goods and 10 percent on all imported goods—in effect, returning America to the protectionist posture that was our historical norm. Despite a great cacophony from doomsaying economists, Trump seems determined to realize his first administration’s promise of a revolution in U.S. trade policy. He has even suggested replacing the income tax entirely with tariffs, a politically fanciful idea that nevertheless signals his commitment to tariffs. Moreover, he chose a pro-industrial policy vice presidential nominee and still listens to his hawkish trade advisors Peter Navarro and Lighthizer. What’s more, the legal and procedural obstacles for President Trump to enact his desired tariffs are minimal. Recent analysis by CSIS found that the president has sufficiently broad legal authority to unilaterally impose massive import duties, with no legislation required. Of course, that possibility may not become reality if the administration is mired in infighting and internal resistance. Most ruinous to Trump’s trade vision would be economic policymakers and advisors who quietly cling to Republican free-market orthodoxy and restrain or subvert President Trump’s desires for trade and industrial policy. Trump has no shortage of committed free-traders among his closest advisers, namely Larry Kudlow, Kevin Hassett, the former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the billionaire hedge fund manager John Paulson, whom Trump has publicly suggested as a potential Treasury Secretary. The greatest risk is that these advisors will amplify the media’s already alarmist rhetoric about protective tariffs to persuade Trump to weaken or drop his pledged package. In Trump’s last administration, a ringleader of this resistance was none other than donor-turned–Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, whom the New York Times identified as one of the administration’s “strongest voices for the free-trade position.” Publicly, Mnuchin toed the pro-tariff line, but he provided internal resistance to Trump’s economic nationalism. It was Mnuchin’s feud with Navarro that reportedly weakened the American negotiating stance with China in the pivotal trade talks of 2018. Crucially, some of Trump’s key donors and likely appointees now appear to genuinely support his economic agenda. This camp of free-trade skeptics extends beyond Trump’s established retinue of trade hawks, led by Lighthizer and Navarro, who are both likely to return to the administration. Lighthizer has even been floated for Treasury Secretary. Trump’s circle of advisors has grown to include some new voices who could be powerful advocates for the president’s trade and industrial policies. One of the most encouraging figures among Trump’s new circle of friends is Scott Bessent, ironically George Soros’s former chief investment officer. Though not a factor in Trump’s earlier campaigns or the first administration, Bessent has become “Trump’s New Obsession,” per a recent Wall Street Journal profile—one of his most respected economic advisers, and even a contender to be Secretary of the Treasury. His newfound prominence is a great boon to the prospects for real trade reform in the next administration.  Most importantly, Bessent is a reasonable and articulate interlocutor for an economic agenda that faces considerable public scrutiny and controversy. Speaking at the National Conservatism Conference in July, Bessent explained the inherent value of tariffs: Industrial policy solutions that rely on changing relative prices at the market level create better outcomes and will tend to be more effective than what we have seen from the Biden administration, which requires the government to pick winners and losers. This is why tariffs can be a potent economic tool since they operate at the market level. Such authentic support of tariffs is rare in Washington and has been for at least a generation. To have “one of the most brilliant men on Wall Street,” as Trump calls Bessent, endorse his trade agenda undoubtedly strengthens Trump’s resolve. As Trump lavishes praise on Bessent and the once-private investor talks to the press, one might expect that he will play a role in the next administration. Another surprising trade hawk is Howard Lutnick, co-chair of the 2024 presidential transition team and billionaire CEO of financial services firm Cantor Fitzgerald. Speaking at the Madison Square Garden rally on October 27, Lutnick denounced NAFTA, decried offshoring, and defined America First as “American citizens employed first.” Lutnick recently endorsed Trump’s tariffs (in tandem with corporate tax cuts), stating, “Tariffs will protect our farmers. Manufacturing will employ our people and energy will drive down our costs.”  Elite opinion, more broadly, has quietly shifted in favor of a new attitude towards trade and industrial policies. This can be seen on Wall Street with Bessent and Lutnick as well as in Washington, where the respected Sen. Bill Hagerty (R-TN), a likely senior Trump appointee, has endorsed trade restrictions on friendly countries to promote reciprocity. Meanwhile, the increasingly conservative tech sector has become fascinated with rebuilding the defense industrial base (and securing lucrative government contracts). Even Elon Musk, no great friend of tariffs, has supported Trump’s plan, noting that it may cause “temporary hardship […] When the storm passes and everyone realizes we are on sounder footing, there will be a rapid recovery to a healthier, sustainable economy.”  The prospects for real trade reform in a second Trump administration appear surprisingly bright. Some of the next Trump administration’s top economic officials could almost certainly be free-trade skeptics who want to support American industry and reverse the damage of globalization. In general, Trump’s trade and industrial policy proposals seem to be more popular among GOP donors and policymakers than they have ever been before. The president’s nationalist economic agenda may progress much further in his second administration than it did in the first.  Even as support for Trump’s trade policy grows, adoption and implementation in his potential second term will prove difficult. Tariffs on friendly countries in Europe and Asia have been and will be a tough sell; most of the GOP only tolerates industrial policy and trade restrictions in the context of the “U.S.–China great power competition.” Internal ideological resistance is a major problem, but Trump may have the political momentum and human capital to overcome it. In his speeches and policy proposals, Trump has made it clear that, if elected, he wants to bring a quick and decisive end to the free-trade era in American economic history. With friends like his, he might be able to pull it off.  The post This Time, Team Trump Wants Tariffs appeared first on The American Conservative.

Politics Trump Already Won  It’s the Donald’s world; we’re only living in it. (Twitter) Election Day has mercifully arrived, bringing to a close Donald Trump’s electoral trilogy. After nine years of exhaustive campaigning and unprecedented dramas, the American people will finally render their verdict on him and his revolutionary movement. So much ink has been spilled on the 2024 election that I won’t bore TAC’s readers by rehashing polls, prediction models, or betting markets. As we’ll likely see this evening, these self-anointed oracles often hold limited value. Though an entire industry is devoted to understanding the American electorate, the volatility of the past decade has rendered much of it obsolete. At this stage, the only certainty is uncertainty. Tonight’s results could be decisive—or they may plunge the country into weeks of chaos, a la the 2000 Florida recount or the 2020 certification crisis. Nobody knows for sure. What is certain is that this election marks another precarious moment for the United States. The dramas of the past two decades have become mainstays of American politics: impeachments, assassination attempts, indictments, media scandals, and coups are no longer Constitutional bugs but defining features of the American system. The battle between competing visions of America—as a nation or as an empire—remains the defining question of our time. Despite Washington’s hopes that Donald Trump’s potential electoral defeat or imprisonment will end this debate in their favor, it is likely that this fundamental constitutional struggle will persist long after Trump’s tenure as the de facto head of American public life. Ominously for neoliberals, a Harris victory tonight will not erase the influence of Trump’s personality from public life. A generation of Americans has come of age in the shadow of Trump’s America First revolution. For voters under 30, Trumpian rhetoric, theatrics, and grievances are the only politics they’ve meaningfully engaged with. Many men, in particular, have embraced Trump’s combative style as a response to an elite culture they feel ignores their economic and social interests. In crucial ways, Trump effectively canceled cancel culture: left-wing rhetorical policing failed to contain him, and his perseverance through a decade of media attacks has blazed a trail for future anti-establishment crusaders. On policy, the future of American partisan realignment is secure. The convergence of reform-minded actors under the Trump banner is multi-generational and potent. Bobby Kennedy’s broad agenda has largely been absorbed by Republican voters, while Tulsi Gabbard’s realism and restraint have become the dominant perspectives on foreign policy. Figures like Elon Musk, David Sacks, and Bill Ackman now form the foundation of a renewed business wing within the party. Senator J.D. Vance’s selection as the vice-presidential nominee positions him as the movement’s heir apparent—the face of the Republican Party’s new commitment to trade protection and domestic industry. Without Trump’s 2024 campaign, traditional conservative interests, represented by Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, might have prevailed. Yet Trump’s decisions this cycle have ensured a strong cohort to whom he can pass the baton. Democrats may not yet realize it, but the America First movement is still in its infancy. Of course, Donald Trump may win tonight. If he does, it will be the largest political upheaval since the election of 1828, when Andrew Jackson swept aside the Eastern elite and reoriented American democracy to serve the interests of middle America. Trump’s political comeback would be the greatest in our national history, delivering a decisive, shattering blow to the decaying neoliberal world order. Should Kamala Harris’s deeply reactionary campaign fail, it is unlikely the United States will ever elect another neoliberal to office. The consequences for global institutions and liberal trade agreements, which have long been underpinned by American commitments, will be obvious and far-reaching. Regardless of the election result tonight, the consequences of Donald Trump’s decade in public life will impact us for a generation. Despite reactionary efforts to undo Trump’s movement, the die has already been cast. Votes are still outstanding, but on matters of style and substance, Donald Trump already won. The post Trump Already Won  appeared first on The American Conservative.