Overview[1] On October 8, 2023, following the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre carried out the previous day, Hezbollah opened a front against Israel from Lebanon “in support of the Gaza Strip.” Since the beginning of the fighting, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Amal, al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyya, the Lebanese Resistance Brigades and the Syrian Social-Nationalist Party have joined Hezbollah in the fighting, to a greater or lesser degree. Unlike Hezbollah, which has so far claimed responsibility for more than 2,200 attacks, the auxiliary organizations have claimed responsibility for “only” a few dozens. Most were rocket fire targeting military and civilian sites in northern Israel, along with attempts to penetrate the border and exchanges of fire with IDF forces. Although there are ideological and religious differences between Hezbollah and most of the other organizations, they have been cooperating since the days of the Israeli presence in south Lebanon and the Second Lebanon War. In ITIC assessment, the auxiliary organizations’ operations are fully coordinated with Hezbollah, and sometimes the operate in concert. As long as the fighting between Israel and Lebanon is waged within the framework of the so-called “equations,” Hezbollah can be expected to limit the organizations’ activities. However, in the event of further escalation and an all-out war, Hezbollah will most likely loosen the reins and give them more freedom to attack Israeli territory, IDF forces and civilians. The Palestinian Organizations in Lebanon Hamas Order of combat and deployment The Hamas branch in Lebanon operates mainly in the -Burj al-Shemali and al-Buss Palestinian refugee camps near Tyre in south Lebanon, but it also has a presence in the Burj al-Barajneh refugee camp in Beirut and the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp near Sidon.[2] According to estimates, Hamas in Lebanon has about 1,500 fighters who underwent training in Iran (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 15, 2023). According to reports, since October 7, 2023, Hamas has been recruiting more fighters in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon (al-Jazeera, December 18, 2023). Senior Hamas operatives and senior Lebanese figures stated that in recent months hundreds of new operatives from 12 Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon joined the ranks of the Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing. However, most of the recruits apparently remain in the camps to assist with local activities, and only occasionally go to the Israeli border region, usually to fire rockets. A New York Times correspondent who visited the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp in Sidon reported seeing recruiting posters in the streets which offered training for the “new al-Aqsa generation” (New York Times, August 24, 2024). In December 2023, Hamas announced a new youth movement called “Pioneers of the al-Aqsa Flood” in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, especially in Ein al-Hilweh. According to Hamas, its objective was to establish a cadre to serve as “a resistance vanguard force which will participate in the liberation of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque.” In reality, the objective is to provide an organizational framework for ideological recruitment and to train young Palestinians in the refugee camps in Lebanon as terrorist operatives to fight Israel from the Lebanese border, following the model of youth movements of other terrorist organizations.[3] A boy who joined “Pioneers of the al-Aqsa Flood” (“The 2006 war is remembered and will not be repeated” X account December 12, 2023) Attacking Israel Since October 8, 2023, Hamas’ military wing in Lebanon has claimed responsibility for 13 attacks on Israel, the two first of which were firing 15 rockets at the Western Galilee on October 10, 2023 and an attempted cross-border infiltration by three nukhba operatives on October 14, 2023. Their main activity has been firing concentrated rocket barrages at civilian and military targets, mainly in the Western Galilee, but also at more distant targets, including a 15 rocket attack on Haifa Bay on November 12, 2023. Hamas operatives also made attempts to infiltrate Israeli territory and shoot at IDF forces in the border regions.       Launching rockets at IDF posts andcamps on the northern border (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, May 3, 2024). The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Order of combat and deployment The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) has an active presence in the refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria. The networks are closely connected, operate together and can be regarded as a single unit. Their facilities include headquarters, offices, weapons and training bases. The ITIC does not have exact data on the number of PIJ operatives in south Lebanon, but according to the PIJ mourning notices for 23 of its operatives killed in the fighting, 19 belonged to the Syrian branch of the Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military wing, and therefore it can be assumed that the organization relies mainly on moving manpower from Syria to south Lebanon. Attacks on Israel Since the start of hostilities, the Jerusalem Brigades have carried out at least seven attacks, most of them attempts to infiltrate into Israeli territory while firing small arms at IDF forces. The Jerusalem Brigades’ only claim of responsibility was issued on October 9, 2023, following an infiltration in the north of the country in which three IDF soldiers were killed. The PIJ confirmed that two of its operatives were killed (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, October 9, 2023; Quds Agency, October 10, 2023). Regarding 18 other operatives, according to reports they were killed while performing their “combat duty” or “jihad duty” on the border of “occupied Palestine,” without specifying the circumstances. Coordination between Hezbollah and the Palestinian organizations Cooperation between Hamas and Hezbollah has increased since 2017, when Yahya al-Sinwar was elected head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip and worked to restore the movement’s relations with Iran, Hezbollah and Syria, which had deteriorated after Hamas supported the uprising against the Assad regime in 2011. In addition, senior Hamas figures moved to Lebanon after being forced to leave Turkey, led by Saleh al-‘Arouri, deputy chairman of the Hamas political bureau, who became Hamas’ main liaison with Hezbollah. He held the position until he was eliminated in the Hezbollah stronghold of Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in southern Beirut on January 2, 2024. Six other Hamas terrorist operatives were killed in the attack, including Samir Fendi who was responsible for Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades activities in Lebanon (New Lines Magazine, November 3, 2023).[4] PIJ leader Ziyad al-Nakhalah has also been living in Lebanon since he left Syria in 2011, and he maintains regular and close contact with the Hezbollah leadership.[5] Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah deputy secretary general, confirmed the existence of intelligence coordination between Hezbollah and Hamas during Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021 (al-Mayadeen, July 8, 2021). On June 29, 2021, the late Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, met in Beirut with Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah secretary general, to sum up Operation Guardian of the Walls, and according to reports they noted that the depth of relations between Hezbollah and Hamas was essential for the “resistance axis”[6] (al-Manar, June 29, 2021). On April 6, 2023, Hamas fired 34 rockets at Israel from south Lebanon, simultaneously with rocket fire attacking Israel from the Gaza Strip and southern Syria. The excuse for the rocket fire was the clashes between Israeli police officers and Palestinians in front of al-Aqsa Mosque, however, according to reports, the rocket fire was coordinated between Hamas, Hezbollah and Esmail Qaani, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ Qods Force.[7] “Palestinian sources” reported that after Operation al-Aqsa Flood began on October 7, 2023, Hamas and PIJ operatives in Lebanon moved to the south of the country under the auspices of Hezbollah (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 15, 2023). Ihsan Ataya, who is head of the PIJ department for Arab and international affairs, a member of the political bureau and PIJ representative in Lebanon, said there was coordination between the “Palestinian resistance” and the “resistance axis” at the highest levels, especially Hezbollah, and that joint operations rooms had been established to monitor “the progress of the fighting from all angles” (al-‘Ahed, October 26, 2023). Ibrahim al-Amin, editor-in-chief of the Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, and who is considered close to Hassan Nasrallah, reported that a joint operations room of all “resistance axis” members had been established after October 7, 2023 for the daily coordination of the fighting on the ground as well as to coordinate strategic and political activity (al-Akhbar, October 20, 2023). On September 2, 2023, about a month before the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre of October 7, 2023, Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah secretary general, met with Saleh al-‘Arouri, deputy head of Hamas’ political bureau, and Ziyad al-Nakhalah, PIJ secretary general. According to reports they discussed the “firm, determined position of all the resistance axis forces in confronting the Zionist enemy” and the importance of “permanent daily coordination” of the entire “resistance” movement, especially in “Palestine” and Lebanon, during war as well (al-Manar, September 2, 2023). On October 25, 2023, Nasrallah, al-‘Arouri and al-Nakhalah met and reportedly agreed to continue coordinating and monitoring developments on a regular, daily basis (al-Nashra, October 25, 2023). On May 15, 2024, Nasrallah met with a delegation of senior Hamas figures, which included Khalil al-Haya and Muhammad Nasr, both members of the Hamas political bureau, and Osama Hamdan, the ranking Hamas member in Lebanon. They reportedly discussed the latest events and developments in the Gaza Strip and Israel, and emphasized the unity and cooperation of the various arenas (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, May 15, 2024).     Right: al-‘Arouri (right), Nasrallah and al-Nakhalah (left) (al-Manar, September 2, 2023). Left: Nasrallah (second from the right) and the Hamas delegation (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, May 15, 2024) At the beginning of the war, Israel’s security establishment identified Palestinian terrorist operatives, mostly from the PIJ, who operated as an organic force within Hezbollah’s Radwan Force and wore Hezbollah uniforms. According to reports, Hezbollah added hundreds of PIJ terrorist operatives to its ranks to fight on the northern border (Israeli Kan 11 TV, February 13, 2024). On August 28, 2024, Faras Qassem, a senior PIJ terrorist operative, was eliminated in an Israeli Air Force aircraft attack on the Syria-Lebanon border. According to reports, he was responsible for formulating the operational plans of the PIJ in Syria and Lebanon and participated in recruiting Palestinian terrorist operatives for Hezbollah. It was reported that several other PIJ operatives en route to Lebanon to join Hezbollah were also killed (IDF spokesperson, August 28, 2024). The PIJ’s military wing confirmed that Faras Hussein Qassem was killed with two other operatives from the Jerusalem Brigades’ Syrian branch “while carrying out their jihad duty” (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, August 28, 2024). Hezbollah also confirmed that one of its operatives was killed in the attack (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 28, 2024). Activity decreases as the fighting progresses The vast majority of Hamas and the PIJ attacks targeting Israel from south Lebanon were carried out in the first months of the fighting, and a sharp decrease began in February 2024. The last Hamas claim of responsibility was issued on May 15, 2024, and the last PIJ claim on May 8, 2024. Ihsan Ataya, the PIJ representative in Lebanon, said that military operations depended on the close monitoring of the Israeli army patrols, their vehicles, soldiers and officers, to ensure they were in firing range, but the IDF forces had increased their precautionary measures on the northern border. He said no decision prevented the Palestinian “organizations” from fighting the “enemy,” they were prepared to attack any “enemy military target” and were fully coordinated with the “resistance” forces in south Lebanon. However he added, the fighting also continued in other arenas. Naji Malaeb, a Lebanese military expert, pointed out that the Palestinians’ “limited weapons” had little effect on the fighting compared to Hezbollah’s weapons. He added that Israel’s intelligence and air superiority made it difficult for Palestinian “militants” to operate in south Lebanon. He also mentioned that the Palestinian organizations wanted to avoid giving Israel a reason to attack the refugee camps (al-Jazeera, February 17, 2024). The Amal Movement[8] Order of combat and deployment According to reports, Amal has more than 17,000 armed operatives, including 2,200 operatives in elite forces trained to carry out “takeover and sabotage” operations. The Amal forces are also reportedly responsible for protecting settlements and that each group is accompanied by a company of elite fighters (al-Mahatta YouTube channel, December 28, 2023). Since October 8, 2023, Amal has deployed its fighters along the entire length of the border, from al-Naqoura in the west to Mt. Hermon in the east (al-Nahar, November 2, 2023; al-Akhbar, February 6, 2024). Muhammad Khawaja, Amal faction representative in the Lebanese Parliament, claimed the movement had a presence “in all the villages on the southern border” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 5, 2024). Attacks on Israel Amal does not provide details about its combat activities. So far, 20 Amal operatives have been reported killed in the fighting, but the circumstances were not reported, only that they were killed “while fulfilling their jihadist and national duty in the defense of Lebanon and the south” (al-Akhbar, February 6, 2024). According to reports, Amal attacked Israel with artillery and Katyusha and Grad rockets (al-Mahatta YouTube channel, December 28, 2023). Hashem Jaber, a retired lieutenant general in the Lebanese army, claimed Amal’s combat activity was “limited and symbolic” compared to Hezbollah and carried out under Hezbollah aegis (al-Nahar, November 2, 2023). Amal and Hezbollah connections Like Hezbollah, Amal is a Shiite movement. However, while Hezbollah is a religious organization operating according to the concepts and perceptions of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Amal is more secular. Nevertheless, Amal and Hezbollah were closely allied politically, and were known in Lebanon as the “Shi’ite couple.” Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Amal’s leader, said the movement stood with Hezbollah in the defense of all Lebanese territories, but admitted that it did not have Hezbollah’s military capabilities (Lebanese NBN network, February 4, 2024). Although Berri, as speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, is supposed to represent the interests of the entire Lebanese population, he is Hezbollah’s official representative in the diplomatic talks currently being held, mainly with the United States and France, to end the fighting in south Lebanon and later to demark the Lebanon-Israel border. Berri himself said he was not afraid of his diplomatic role because diplomatic resistance was an essential part of the resistance (Lebanese NBN network, February 4, 2024). Hassan Nasrallah and Nabih Berri (al-Nashra, October 25, 2016) Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group)[9] Order of combat and deployment Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya operates a military wing called the al-Fajr Forces. It was established in 1982 with the outbreak of the First Lebanon War and operated against the IDF in Lebanon until 2000, when the IDF withdrew from the country. The force was concentrated in and around Sidon, and in current assessment the situation has not changed (al-Jazeera, May 11, 2024). Al-Fajr has about 500 operatives, but its potential for recruitment is high because of the economic hardships of the Sunni population in the north of the country (al-Hadath, June 22, 2024). A “source” in al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya confirmed that dozens of young men from Aqar and Tripoli in northern Lebanon have joined the al-Fajr Forces since the beginning of the fighting (Nidaa al-Watan, May 8, 2024). Muhammad Taqoush, movement’s secretary general, stated that “after the forces announced their military activity, we noticed that many young people, enthusiastic about what was happening in Palestine, wanted to be a part of defeating the occupier and resisting the enemy, so they visited our centers and met with a number of commanders to express their desire to join to our ranks” (al-Nashra, October 27, 2023). Al-Fajr operatives (Janoub360, April 30, 2024) Attacks on Israel When the fighting began on October 8, 2023, Bassam Hammoud, the al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya political bureau’s deputy head, called on its operatives to “seriously prepare to intervene in the war against Israel.” He reported al-Fajr operatives were on standby in the border areas to counter any Israeli “aggression” against Lebanon (al-Nashra, October 9, 2023). The movement claimed responsibility for firing five rocket barrages at the Kiryat Shmona region between October 18, 2023 and January 6, 2024 (al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya website, October 18, 2023: January 6, 2024). While there have been no claims of responsibility since January 6, 2024, Bassam Hammoud stated that al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya had not stopped attacking, claiming that al-Fajr operatives were in the field and continued operations as usual. He added that they would “continue to resist until the liberation of Lebanese lands and victory in the Gaza Strip” (al-Jadeed, June 25, 2024). Relations with Hamas Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and Hamas are both branches of the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore share a close ideological kinship, but their cooperation increased significantly after the elections for the al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya Shura Council in September 2022, won by the faction led by Muhammad Taqoush and close to Hamas. According to reports, many senior al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya figures receive their salaries directly from Hamas (Asas Media, September 20, 2022). A “senior al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya figure” confirmed that the movement had been carrying out “joint combat operations” with Hamas in south Lebanon since October 8, 2023 (Arab News, March 28, 2024). Bassam Hammoud, deputy head of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, said that “we and Hamas are two sides of the same coin in the confrontation with the Zionist enemy” (al-Jazeera, January 4, 2024). However, he also said that despite their ideological similarity, they had different opinions regarding internal issues in the Palestinian and Lebanese arenas (AWP, July 27, 2024). According to Muhannad al-Hajj Ali, a researcher at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya in fact operates as an affiliate of Hamas (al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 26, 2024). The similarity between al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and Hamas is also reflected in the mourning notices for the ten al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya operatives killed in the fighting: The Israeli attack in Beirut on January 2, 2024, which eliminated Saleh al-‘Arouri, deputy head of Hamas’ political bureau, also killed Mahmoud Zaki Shahin and Mohammed Bashasha. Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya confirmed that the two were operatives in its rank, and that Shahin was a commander (al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya website, January 4, 2024). A senior al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya figure stated that the two had been al-‘Arouri’s bodyguards (Arab News, March 28, 2024). The mourning notice for Bashasha’s death was jointly issued by his family, al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya and Hamas, and showed the logos of both Hamas and al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya (saidaonline.com, January 4, 2024). The announcement of Bashasha’s death with the logos of Hamas (left) and al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya (saidaonline.com, January 4, 2024) On May 17, 2024, Sharhabil Ali al-Sayid was killed in an Israeli Air Force attack in the Lebanon Valley. The IDF spokesperson reported that al-Sayid had been a senior al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya operative in Lebanon and led many terrorist attacks on Israel in cooperation with Hamas in Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, May 17, 2024). He death was not mentioned on the al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya website in Lebanon, but the Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, announced he had been a commander in the organization (Shehab, May 17, 2024). On July 18, 2024, Muhammad Hamed Jabara, aka Abu Mahmoud, was killed in an Israeli Air Force attack in the Lebanon Valley. The IDF spokesperson stated he was a Hamas operative and responsible for promoting attacks and rocket fire from Lebanon, some in cooperation with al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya in Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, July 18, 2024). Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya claimed him as a senior al-Fajr commander (al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya Telegram channel, July 18, 2024). Hamas’ military wing referred to him as a “commander” (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, July 18, 2024). His coffin was draped with the flags of Lebanon, the al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, the Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades and the Palestinian flag (Muhammad Abd al-Aziz-Gaza’s X account, July 19, 2024). His ID and Lebanese internal security forces’ cards (valid until April 5, 2028) were made public; he was a retired officer with the rank of deputy lieutenant. It has been claimed that Lebanon disguises terrorist operatives by providing them with identification from its internal security forces (Tanzim Thuwwar Lebanon X account , July 19, 2024). Right to left: Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya mourning notice for Jabara (al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya Telegram channel, July 18, 2024); Hamas mourning notice (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, July 18, 2024); Jabara’s flag-draped coffin (Muhammad Abd al-Aziz-Gaza’s X account, July 19, 2024); Jabara’s Lebanese internal security forces retired officer’s certificate and his identity card (Tanzim Thuwwar Lebanon X Account, July 19, 2024) Connections with Hezbollah Despite the profound ideological differences between Sunni al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and Shi’ite Hezbollah, they have cooperated in the past. Ibrahim al-Masri, one of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya’s founders, said that al-Fajr operatives participated in the fighting against Israel in south Lebanon in 1982 and “carried out resistance operations” in coordination with Hezbollah operatives, and since then had supported the organization (al-Arabiya, August 1, 2006). In recent years, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and Hezbollah have drifted apart. After the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister, in February 2005, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya joined the March 8 Camp of Hezbollah opponents, like most of the Sunni population in Lebanon. After the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya supported the rebels, while Hezbollah assisted the Syrian army in its repression (L’Orient Today, November 2, 2023). After the election of Muhammad Taqoush as head of al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya in September 2022, Hamas-encouraged rapprochement between the organizations began, and Taqoush met with Hassan Nasrallah (Carnegie Endowment, October 17, 2022). He said, “We agree with Hezbollah on many issues, including fighting the Israeli enemy, and we disagree on other issues. We and Hezbollah are similar in many matters” (al-Akhbar, December 9, 2022). When the current fighting in south Lebanon began, Taqoush hinted at cooperation, or at least coordination, with Hezbollah. He pointed out that “there is no harm or embarrassment in coordinating with the Shi’ite resistance faction,” and added that the operations of al-Fajr operatives on the Israel-Lebanon border were not coordinated with Hezbollah, but communication at the level of senior officials and operatives in the southern arena existed and was slowly increasing in order to identify targets and attack the “enemy” (al-Nashra, October 27, 2023). He added that “coordination with the Shi’ite Hezbollah is essential to fight Israel” (Arab News, March 26, 2024). Bassem Hammoud, deputy head of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya’s political bureau, stated that fighting Israel “requires closing ranks, unifying positions and coordinating on the ground,” despite the fact that there were still differences regarding internal Lebanese politics (AWP, July 27, 2024). On June 28, 2024, Hassan Nasrallah met with Muhammad Taqoush, and they agreed that the “resistance” forces had to continue cooperating in order to support the Gazans (al-Akhbar, June 28, 2024). According to reports, the meeting provided a basis for new relations between the movements, after for years al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya had belonged to the camp opposed to Hezbollah in Lebanon. A “senior al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya source” said that the objective of the meeting was to establish cooperation and coordination for the purpose of managing the campaign in south Lebanon, but he had reservations regarding a future political alliance between the parties because of Hezbollah’s involvement in the war in Syria and negative behavior towards Sunnis in Lebanon (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 28, 2024). Nasrallah meets with Taqoush (al-Akhbar Telegram channel, June 28, 2024) According to a “source” in north Lebanon, Hezbollah and al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya need each other, since Hezbollah needs a Sunni faction to refute the claims that it decided on its own to take Lebanon on a “combat adventure” and that the other sectors of the Lebanese population were not part of the decision. Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyya exploited Hezbollah’s decision to attack Israel from south Lebanon to regain a popular base in areas where it previously operated at the parliamentary and public level (Nidaa al-Watan, May 8, 2024). The Lebanese Resistance Brigades[10] Order of combat and deployment According to “sources,” the Lebanese Resistance Brigades have more than 10,000 fighters, most of them Sunni. It was also reported that since the beginning of the fighting in south Lebanon, its operatives were in the rear posts on the border and worked in the field of logistical support (MTV, July 16, 2024). Attacks on Israel On July 15, 2024, the Lebanese Resistance Brigades stated that since the beginning of the fighting in south Lebanon on October 8, 2023, the organization’s operatives had been present in the field and carried out logistical support missions which had claimed dead and wounded. However, in view of the developments on the ground, they announced they were also engaged in “directly dealing with any threat,” and wanted to convey the message that the Lebanese people would not waive their right to defend their land and sovereignty, and that Lebanese youth would not remain neutral to threats. The organization also claimed to be highly prepared to deal with any threat or “foolish attempt by the enemy” (al-Mayadeen, July 15, 2024). A “senior source” in the Lebanese Resistance Brigades stated that they joined the fighting on October 10, 2023, along with the “resistance” in south Lebanon, and that they were effectively involved on the “frontline of the confrontation with the Zionist enemy on the ground to confront and protect Lebanon.” “The source” claimed the Brigades were a “parallel deterrent force” to Hezbollah, but rejected the claims that they might replace Hezbollah fighters if the latter had to retreat to the north of the Litani River after the war, with the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (al-Nabā’, Kuwait , July 17, 2024). So far, the organization has claimed responsibility for two attacks: July 12, 2024: A rocket attack on an IDF post. According to a Lebanese Resistance Brigades’ operations room statement to the Israeli “occupation,” the objective of the attack was to support the Palestinian people and protect Lebanon. It was also carried out to mark the 18th anniversary of the Second Lebanon War and the organization’s commitment “to continue the resistance until victory and liberation” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, July 12, 2024). July 19, 2024: An anti-tank missile and artillery attack on an IDF post (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, July 19, 2024).     Lebanese Resistance Brigades terrorist operatives (Right: al-‘Ahed, February 14, 2020. Left: al-Mayadeen, July 13, 2024) The Syrian Social-Nationalist Party[11] Order of combat and deployment The Syrian Social Nationalist Party operates a military wing called Eagles of the Storm, which was established in 1974 and participated in the civil war in Lebanon and in fighting against the IDF forces and the South Lebanese army. In 1985 was also responsible for the first suicide bombing attack carried out by a woman. During the Syrian Civil War, its military wing helped the Assad regime and the forces loyal to it against the rebels, and then participated alongside them in the fight against ISIS (Clingendael, January 2019). The Eagles of the Storm are estimated to have between 6,000 and 8,000 operative, most of them Christians but some Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims. The party is active in various areas in Lebanon and in the rural areas of Homs and Hamat in Syria (Foreign Policy, March 28, 2016). In March 2023, Rabi’ Banat, the party president, announced a “return to the jihad arena.” Maher al-Dana, head of media relations, said they had decided “to confront Israel” and accused that the previous party leadership party of “preferring political and government jobs at the expense of the resistance activity in the south” (Nidaa al-Watan, April 7, 2023). On May 29, 2023, a high-ranking delegation of the party’s leadership visited an Eagles’ military site in south Lebanon near the Israeli border to examine the combat readiness of its operatives (Lebanese News Agency, May 29, 2023). Attacks on Israel On October 7, 2023, the party congratulated Hamas for its attack on Israel and claimed that Operation al-Aqsa Flood established an equation of “the unity of the arenas” and united the fronts of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, South Lebanon and the Golan Heights. They noted their “absolute readiness” to participate in the fighting and announced that they were on full alert (al-Jadid, October 7, 2023). On October 8, 2023, the Eagles of the Storm issued a video of anti-tank missiles being prepared for launch. The caption read, “When determination combines with the will to resist, you will find our eagles soaring over the south to free Palestine together, all of Palestine, from […] the occupier.” They also wrote, “We promise and pledge to you that the struggle will continue until victory and liberation” (Eagles of the Storm X account, October 8, 2023). An operative next to an anti-tank missile (Eagles of the Storm X account, October 8, 2023) Rabi’ Banat, the party president, claimed the “resistance” in Lebanon, including the Eagles of the Storm, was ready to “follow what the resistance started in Palestine.” Amer al-Tal, head of the party’s supreme council, said the party was ” fully prepared to prepare the Eagles for entering the jihad arena” (Party website, October 12, 2023). “Senior sources” in the party claimed the Eagles had been present in south Lebanon “since the 1990s,” and that the party had “centers whose sole purpose is to protect the honor of our nation” (Sada Wadi al-Tim, December 15, 2023). In July 2024, Rabi’ Banat reported that its operatives would remain “at the forefront of the fight against the enemy” and that “the jihad arena will not lose its Eagle friends” (Party website, July 23, 2024). The Syrian Social-Nationalist Party and its military wing have not claimed responsibility for direct attacks on Israel, but the reports of the only two Eagles of the Storm casualties indicate that they were on the front lines in south Lebanon. According to the mourning notice for Wissam Salim, the first terrorist operative to be killed, he died “at point-blank range while performing his national duty in south Lebanon” (Party website, December 15, 2023). According to the mourning notice for Ibrahim Akram al-Musawi, the second terrorist operative to be killed, he “performed his national duty in south Lebanon in resistance at point-blank range” (the party’s website, July 22, 2024). Connections with Hezbollah The Eagles of the Strom and Hezbollah have had long-standing cooperation since the period of fighting the IDF in south Lebanon, then in the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and in the armed conflicts between Hezbollah and the Sunni militias in Lebanon in 2008. The cooperation continued during the Syrian Civil War, when Hezbollah operatives provided Eagles’ operatives with military training (Foreign Policy, March 28, 2016). Maher al-Dana, head of media relations, stated that the Eagles of the Storm and Hezbollah had a “partnership in blood” (Nidaa al-Watan, April 7, 2023). Their coordination continues in the current fighting in south Lebanon. According to reports, Wissam Salim, the Eagles’ first casualty, was killed in December 2023 by an Israeli attack on “a group of resistance fighters operating against enemy positions on the southern border,” while Hezbollah also announced that one of its operatives had been killed in the same attack (al-Akhbar, December 16, 2023) . During Salim’s funeral, Rabi’ Banat, the Party president, thanked Hassan Nasrallah, calling him “the master of the resistance and the leader of the axis.”[12] He praised Nasrallah for his “tremendous effort in managing this war in all its political, military, strategic, social and cultural aspects” (Party website, December 16, 2023). Maher al-Dana, head of media relations, said they had established a joint operations room which coordinated the activities of all the “resistance” organizations operating in south Lebanon. He called coordination with Hezbollah “great, both in details and in the whole plan” (al-‘Ahed, December 19, 2023). Appendix A: Casualties Between beginning of the fighting on October 8, 2023 and August 29, 2024, Hezbollah reported 419 operatives killed. The six organizations supporting Hezbollah reported 69 operatives killed: Appendix B: Claims of Responsibility Hamas-Lebanon October 10, 2023: A “concentrated” launch of rockets targeting the Western Galilee (Hamas Telegram channel, October 10, 2023). October 15, 2023: Twenty rockets fired at Shlomi and Nahariya (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, December 25, 2023). October 19, 2023: A barrage of thirty rockets fired at Nahariya, Shlomi and the Western Galilee (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, October 19, 2023). November 2, 2023: Twelve rockets fired at Kiryat Shmona and its surroundings (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, November 2, 2023). November 6, 2023: Twelve rockets fired at Nahariya and northern Haifa (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, November 6, 2023). November 12, 2023: Rocket barrages fired at northern Haifa, Shlomi and Nahariya (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, November 12, 2023). December 25, 2023: Rocket barrage fired at the Western Galilee (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, December 25, 2023). January 17, 2024: Twenty rockets fired at the Upper Galilee (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, January 17, 2024). February 28, 2024: Barrage of 40 Grad rockets fired at the Western Galilee (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, February 28, 2024). April 21, 2024: Twenty Grad rockets fired at the Upper Galilee (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, April 21, 2024). April 29, 2024: “Concentrated” rocket barrages fired at the Upper Galilee (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, April 29, 2024). May 15, 2024: “Concentrated” rocket barrages fired at the Western Galilee (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, May 15, 2024). July 20, 2024: Barrage of rockets at the Upper Galilee (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, July 20, 2024). PIJ-Lebanon On October 9, 2023, the PIJ claimed responsibility for the infiltration of a squad of terrorist operatives from Lebanese territory into Israel and shooting at IDF forces. Three IDF soldiers were killed; two PIJ were killed (RT network in the Arabic language, October 9, 2023). Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya October 18, 2023: Rockets fired at “the positions of the Zionist enemy in the occupied territories” (al-Akhbar, October 18, 2023). January 5, 2024: Two rocket barrages fired at Kiryat Shmona (al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya website, January 6, 2024). The Lebanese Resistance Brigades July 12, 2024: Rockets fired at an IDF post to mark the 18th anniversary of the Second Lebanon War (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, July 12, 2024). July 19, 2024: Anti-tank missiles launched and artillery fired at an IDF post (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, July 19, 2024). The post The Organizations Assisting Hezbollah in Combat Against Israel appeared first on The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

*Updated from October 8, 2023 Overview[1] This past week Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 48 attacks on military and civilian targets in Israel. Two civilians and a member of a security squad were injured and there was considerable property damage. Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked Hezbollah targets and operatives in south Lebanon and the Lebanon Valley. Hezbollah announced the death of one of its operatives. An attempted targeted attack was carried out to eliminate a senior terrorist operative of Hamas in Lebanon; the attack failed. Hezbollah-affiliated media outlets falsely claimed that the attack on the IDF intelligence base carried out in retaliation for the killing of Fuad Shukr was successful. The claim has led to increasing assessment that Hezbollah is trying to avoid escalation and a comprehensive war. The UN Security Council extended UNIFIL’s mandate for another year. Syria: Three operatives of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s military wing and a Hezbollah operative were killed in an Israeli Air Force attack on a vehicle near the border with Lebanon. South Lebanon Hezbollah attacks During the past week (August 26 to September 2, 2024), Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 48 attacks on military and civilian targets in northern Israel, compared to 72 attacks the previous week. The attacks were carried out using anti-tank missiles, artillery, UAVs and various types of rockets. Increased use of explosive drones: This past week Hezbollah claimed responsibility for three explosive drone attacks on surveillance cameras located in IDF posts on the northern border (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 26-27, 2024). In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah will increase its use of explosive drones to attack surveillance cameras, communication and electrical cables, and technical equipment at IDF posts, because the drones are inexpensive, can focus on a target with great precision and are extremely difficult to intercept.     Explosive drone attacks on surveillance cameras located at IDF posts (Right: Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 28, 2024. Left: Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 29, 2024) The attacks according to Hezbollah (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, as of 1 p.m., August 26 – September 2, 2024): September 2, 2024: Three attacks. An anti-tank missile hit a house in a moshav near the border. There were no casualties, the house was damaged (Israeli media, September 2, 2024). September 1, 2024: Ten attacks. A civilian was seriously injured and a member of a security squad was also injured by an anti-tank missile. An anti-tank missile hit a building in Kiryat Shmona; there were no casualties. Ten rockets were fired into the Western Galilee, most of them falling in an open area; there were no casualties. An explosive drone hit near the border; there were no casualties. Twenty rockets were fired at the Mount Miron area. Rockets hit in an open area in a moshav, causing a fire; no casualties were reported (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, September 1, 2024). August 31, 2024: Six attacks. A UAV fell in an open area and a rocket hit near the border; there were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 31, 2024). August 30, 2024: Six attacks. Rockets were fired into Israeli territory from south Lebanon from a launcher damaged in an Israeli Air Force attack. One of the rockets fell in an open area. Forty rockets were fired into the Western Galilee, hitting populated areas. An explosive drone exploded in Metula, causing minor damage to various facilities. There were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 30, 2024). August 29, 2024: Ten attacks. A UAV launched from Syrian territory was intercepted before it crossed the border into Israel. UAVs fell in the northern Golan Heights, causing fires. Anti-tank missiles were fired at Mount Dov. There were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 29, 2024). August 28, 2024: Six attacks. Rockets fell in the Kiryat Shmona area; there were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 28, 2024). August 27, 2024: Four attacks. An IDF soldier was injured when a UAV fell near Safed (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 27, 2024). August 26, 2024 (as of 1 p.m.): Three attacks. UAVs fell in the Upper Galilee and one fell in the Western Galilee. There were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 26, 2024). Hezbollah UAVs According to a lone report, Hezbollah and Iran have spent 20 years developing UAVs, but the sanctions imposed on them have so far prevented them from developing the UAVs to a technological level which would allow them to overcome Israel’s GPS jamming, which still maintains an advantage (MTV Lebanon, August 30, 2024). IDF response In response to Hezbollah’s attacks, Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked Hezbollah targets and operatives in south Lebanon and the Lebanon Valley, including armed squads of terrorist operatives, terrorist facilities, buildings used for military purposes, munitions warehouses, observation posts, launching positions and rocket launchers (IDF spokesperson, August 26-September 2, 2024). An attack on a truck, apparently belonging to Hezbollah, in the north of the Lebanon Valley, was attributed to Israel. After the attack a number of secondary explosions occurred (indicating the truck was carrying weapons. The explosions led to the evacuation of local residents (al-Nahar, August 28, 2024).     Right: The attack on the truck in the Lebanon Valley (al-Nahar, August 28, 2024). Left: Attack on a building in al-Adeisa (IDF spokesperson, August 27, 2024) This past week Hezbollah reported the death of one operative in south Lebanon, Hussein Ahmed al-Musawi, known as Maytham al-Sid, born in 1996, from al-Nabi Chit in the Lebanon Valley (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, September 1, 2024). Hussein Ahmed al-Musawi (Telegram channel of Hezbollah’s combat propaganda arm, September 1, 2024) Attempted elimination of senior Hamas terrorist operative According to reports, on August 26, 2024, an Israeli drone launched two missiles at a car parked [at the side of the road] between the towns of ‘Abra and the Saida neighborhood near the al-Shama’ highway close to Sidon. The attack reportedly targeted Nidal Halihal, aka Abu Omar, a senior Hamas terrorist who was hit while leaving his home towards his car, and the lower part of his body was seriously injured (al-Nahar; al-‘Ahed, August 26, 2024). A “Lebanesesecurity source” claimed Halihal had been “slightly injured” (al-Jazeera, August 26, 2024).     Halihali’s vehicle after the attack near Sidon (Right: al-‘Ahed, August 26, 2024. Left: al-Nahar, August 26,2024) Possible Hezbollah Attempts to Prevent Escalation Following the Hezbollah rocket and UAV attack on Israel on August 25, 2024, in retaliation for the elimination of Fuad Shukr, the organization’s military commander,[2] it is of increasing considered opinion that Hezbollah does not want to escalate the fighting and the chances of a comprehensive war’s breaking out on the northern border have decreased: The al-Mayadeen network, which is affiliated with Hezbollah and the “resistance axis,”[3] cited “knowledgeable sources” who claimed Israel had “confirmed” Hezbollah had hit an Israeli intelligence base as part of the attack called Operation Arba’in.[4] The “sources” claimed that six drones hit the base and IDF forces closed the area for several hours to prevent soldiers and civilians from approaching or entering the base. They also claimed that the operation “was successful beyond the shadow of a doubt” as far as Hezbollah was concerned (al-Mayadeen, August 29, 2024). The Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese daily al-Akhbar also claimed that six drones launched at the base all hit their target (al-Akhbar, August 29, 2024). Contrary to Hezbollah’s claims, neither the intelligence base nor the air force base was actually attacked and no damage was caused. Simia, the electronic unit of Hezbollah’s Executive Committee, issued a notice called Operation Arba’in, which claimed the organization had reacted in a “strong, considered” manner and had not dragged the region into war. It listed as its achievements equating Tel Aviv with the Dahiyeh, exposing the extent of its infiltration of Israeli intelligence, attacking 110 km inside Israeli territory, hitting targets and evading the Iron Dome and Arrow aerial defense systems and defending all its UAV positions against enemy attack. It listed the “enemy’s failures” as “a new failure for Israeli intelligence.” Israel’s proactive [allegedly] action failed to prevent the Hezbollah’s retaliation, the Israeli government [allegedly] had to “invent” a new false narrative which did not even convince the Israeli public, Israel’s defense systems failed to intercept the rockets and UAVs, and Israel had carried out 40 attacks which hit only a number of launch sites (Simia, August 26, 2024). Hezbollah’s Operation Arba’in notice (Simia, August 26, 2024) “Sources” claimed Hezbollah was satisfied with several aspects of the retaliation attack, including its ability to “respond,” and had proven itself in terms of the distances and the level of weapons used (al-Jadeed, August 26, 2024). Muhammad Fneish, a senior Hezbollah figure, claimed the objective of the “resistance retaliation” was to punish the “enemy” and return it to abiding by the rules of confrontation [decided on by Hezbollah]. He claimed Hezbollah could prepare for any future development but did not aspire to a comprehensive war, but if the “enemy” exceeded its borders or attacked civilians, the “resistance” was prepared and would respond accordingly. He claimed “the enemy” would no longer be able to attack without an “appropriate response” (MTV network, August 26, 2024). Ali Shoeib, a correspondent for Hezbollah’s al-Manar TV, said that after the “Islamic resistance” in Lebanon had met its commitment and retaliated for the Israeli attack on the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut, and after it had prevented the “enemy” from attacking the villages in south Lebanon by firing hundreds of rockets at “enemy” bases, it returned to its role of supporting the Gaza Strip (Ali Shoeib’s X account, August 26, 2024). “Diplomatic sources privy to the talks conducted by Washington, Tel Aviv and Beirut,” said Hezbollah had informed the Americans via the Lebanese government that “it was necessary” to adhere to Hezbollah’s “rules of engagement,” as they did not want to expand the war and aspired to avoid damage to infrastructure and civilians. Hezbollah claimed it had no intention of expanding the fighting, otherwise it would have launched its precision missiles in response to the killing of Fuad Shukr. The “sources” added that it was likely the conflict would remain as “support for Hamas” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 26, 2024). Ali al-Amin, editor of the Lebanese news site Janoubia, said that Hezbollah’s retaliation for the killing of Fuad Shukr relieved the pressure being exerted by its supporters to react strongly against Israel and restored some of its damaged dignity (Janoubia, August 29, 2024). Charles Brown, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that after the exchange between Israel and Hezbollah, the risks the war would expand in the near future had lessened (Reuters, August 27, 2024). The Lebanese Government In a speech given on the occasion of the 46th anniversary of the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr,[5] Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, accused the “Israeli war machine” of turning the border villages near Israel into scorched earth using “illegal” weapons and called Israel “absolute evil.” He said the Lebanese government was committed to UN Security Council Resolution 1701, claiming Israel was a serial violator of UN resolutions. He called the war in the Gaza Strip “genocide and a political crime” and called for support for the Palestinian people, adding that “the situation in the Gaza Strip cannot be resolved except by escalating resistance in all available forms, political, public and cultural, and with weapons” (al-Nashra, August 31, 2024). Criticism of Hezbollah Gebran Bassil, chairman of the Free National Movement in Lebanon considered an ally of Hezbollah, criticized the organization’s continued fighting against Israel in the name of supporting the Gaza Strip. Bassil said Hezbollah members had asked him, “What is your [Movement’s] position regarding Hezbollah? One day you say, ‘We are with you in the war,’ and the next day you say, ‘We are against you in the war’.” He answered, “We are with you when you defend Lebanon, we are with you when Israel attacks us, but we are not with you when you start a war against Israel.” Bassil noted they were in favor of a defensive strategy, but not of an attack strategy. He also asked, “What is the purpose of this war in which we participate?” and rejected the justification that it was in aid of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. He said destroying part of Lebanon and having its people killed was not helping the Gaza Strip by (Mary Saadeh’s X account, August 30, 2024). Gebran Bassil (Mary Saadeh’s X account, August 30, 2024) The Lebanese Army An “opposition source” in Lebanon claimed that Hezbollah was taking every possible step to prevent the Lebanese army from equipping itself with the necessary means for deployment on the border, using false excuses ranging from funding to inter-sectarian balances and party disputes. That belies the claim of a “high-level source” from the “Shi’ite couple” [Hezbollah and Amal] alleging that both movements fully support Resolution 1701, including in the sections concerning the deployment of the Lebanese army south of the Litani River (Lebanon al-Kabir, August 29, 2024). According to reports, Joseph Aoun, the commander of the Lebanese army, cancelled all annual vacations abroad for Lebanese army soldiers, including officers, because of the recent escalation in south Lebanon and the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah (al-Nashra, August 27, 2024). According to reports, 4,700 Lebanese army officers and soldiers are prepared to cross the Litani River, a number which does not include approximately 300 management personnel. It was also reported that no response had yet been received from the contributing countries to the request for a grant to recruit 6,000 additional soldiers and deploy them in south Lebanon (Lebanon al-Khabir, August 27, 2024). Josep Borrell, EU foreign minister, said the European Union supported the Lebanese army and was expected to provide it with additional aid next year (al-Nashra, August 30, 2024). UNIFIL UNIFIL mandate extended for another year On August 28, 2024, the UN Security Council unanimously approved the extension of the UNIFIL mandate in Lebanon for another year (Reuters, August 28, 2024): Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, thanked the UN Security Council, France and the United States for understanding Lebanon’s need to preserve the activities of UNIFIL. He also noted Lebanon’s commitment to cooperate in facing the challenges and threats to stability in south Lebanon, and Lebanon’s commitment to implementing international resolutions, first of all Resolution 1701 (Lebanese prime minister’s X account, August 28, 2024). The Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, claimed that the United States had failed in its attempt to change the wording of UNIFIL’s mandate and the status quo had been maintained. It also claimed that the “resistance” had always been suspicious of the activities of the UN forces, since not only did they conduct patrols, they operated radars which the “enemy” could use, either through access to the radar’s data or by penetrating its network “Authorized UNIFIL personnel” stated that the force did not operate against the “resistance” or “in the service” of any of the parties. According to the sources, the radar protects the forces and monitors “Israeli air violations.” They added that the objective of the radar was to warn the force of artillery shells falling on their bases (al-Akhbar, August 29, 2024). Candace Ardell, UNIFIL spokeswoman, said that one of the rockets fired by Hezbollah on August 25, 2024, in retaliation for the killing Fuad Shakr, was fired near a UNIFIL post. She added that on the same day an explosion occurred near another UNIFIL post in the area of ​​Meiss al-Jabal, but no injuries or damage were reported. She said that using areas close to UNIFIL posts to carry out cross-border attacks was unacceptable and constituted a violation of Resolution 1701 (Reuters, August 27, 2024). United States Wages Psychological Warfare on Tinder in Lebanon  The United States Army’s Central Command (CENTCOM) posted several warning messages in Arabic on the Lebanese Tinder app reading, “US [Army] Central Command is on high alert and ready with F-16 Fighting Falcons and A-10 Thunder Bolt sound barrier-breaking fighter jets,” “Don’t take up arms against the United States or its partners,” “The United States will protect its partners in dealing with the threats of the Iranian regime and its proxies.” In expert assessment it was a psychological warfare campaign aimed at Hezbollah operatives in an attempt to deter them from continuing to attack Israel. Tinder later announced the messages had been deleted (Task & Purpose, August 28, 2024). CENTCOM warnings posted on Tinder in Lebanon (Séamus Malekafzali’s X account, August 22, 2024) Syria Senior PIJ terrorist operative eliminated On August 28, 2024, an Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked along the Syria-Lebanon border, killing Faras Qassem, a key operative in the PIJ’s operations department in Syria. He had been in charge of constructing PIJ operational plans in Syria and Lebanon and played a central role in recruiting Palestinian operatives to Hezbollah for terrorist attacks on Israel from Lebanon. According to reports, several other PIJ operatives en route from Syria to Lebanon to carry out terrorist activities for Hezbollah were also killed in the attack (IDF spokesperson, August 28, 2024).[6] According to reports, the attack was carried out in the al-Zabadani region, about nine kilometers east of the Syria-Lebanon border (Ghattas’ X account, August 28, 2024). Two “security sources” said that three of those killed in the attack on the Syria-Lebanon border were PIJ operatives and the fourth was a Hezbollah operative. It was also reported that the vehicle did not transport weapons (Reuters, August 28, 2024).     The Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military wing, confirmed the death of three of its operatives: Faras Hussein Qassem, 37 years old; Osama Mufaq ‘Arisha, 39 years old, and Hussam Ziyad ‘Arisha, 39 years old, all of whom were Jerusalem Brigades operatives in Syria (Jerusalem Brigades’ Telegram channel, August 28, 2024). Hezbollah announced the death of Muhammad Hassan Taha, aka Karar, born in 1972, from Baalbek in the Lebanon Valley (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 28, 2024). According to the social networks, Taha was among the passengers of the vehicle that was attacked and was killed (Hayan Mo’s X account, August 28, 2024). From right to left: Faras Hussein Qassem, Osama Mufaq ‘Arisha, Hussam Ziyad Arisha (Telegram channel of Jerusalem companies, August 28, 2024). Extreme left: Muhammad Hassan Taha (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 28, 2024) The post Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (August 26-September 2 , 2024) appeared first on The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

Highlights On the night of August 27-28, 2024, Israeli security forces launched counterterrorism operations in Jenin and its environs, in the Nur Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm, and the al-Far’a refugee camp in the Tubas area. The operation in Jenin continues (as of September 2, 2024), while the other two operations have been completed. An IDF soldier was killed and at least ten other members of the Israeli security forces were wounded. During the operation, the forces killed more than 25 terrorist operatives in airstrikes and exchanges of fire, including commanders of terrorist networks in Jenin and Tulkarm, detained wanted persons, located explosives laboratories and large quantities of weapons, and destroyed IEDs planted on traffic routes. Concurrently with the IDF operations, two terrorist attacks were carried out. Two car bombs driven by terrorists exploded in the Gush Etzion area, wounding three security personnel. Three policemen were shot dead in a shooting attack in the South Hebron Hills. A car bomb was found near the community of Ateret. During 2024, some processes and trends can be identified that contributed to the increase in terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria, especially in northern Samaria, which in the ITIC’s assessment are expected to continue even after the activity of the Israeli security forces: efforts by Hamas and Iran to encourage terrorist activity through incitement, directing terrorist attacks, and smuggling weapons and money; cooperation between armed terrorist networks belonging to various Palestinian organizations; increasing use of powerful IEDs for terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria and inside Israel; increase attempts to carry out shooting attacks targeting Israeli communities in the Seam Zone. IDF activity in northern Samaria Since the outbreak of the Iron Swords War on October 7, 2023, the Israeli security forces have carried out counterterrorism activities throughout Judea and Samaria to prevent the outbreak of a terrorist front in Judea, Samaria, and east Jerusalem, while fighting in the Gaza Strip and on the northern border with Hezbollah. The activity includes daily detention of wanted persons, along with targeted, extensive raids to seize weapons, destroy IEDs and explosive laboratories, and locate incitement materials and funds for financing terrorism. As part of the security activity, aircraft are also being increasingly used to target wanted operatives and terrorist squads preparing to carry out attacks.[1] On the night of August 27-28, 2024, Israeli security forces launched three large-scale counterterrorism operations in northern Samaria: Operation “Summer Camps” in Jenin and its environs (still ongoing, as of September 2, 2024); Operation “Ir Shemesh” in the Nur Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm (ended August 30, 2024); and Operation “Olim Kita” in the al-Far’a refugee camp in the Tubas area (ended August 29, 2024). The forces killed more than 25 terrorist operatives in exchanges of fire and airstrikes, detained wanted persons, seized large quantities of weapons, located explosive laboratories, and destroyed IEDs hidden on traffic routes. In addition, the Israeli forces surrounded the hospitals in the areas of activity to prevent wanted persons from fleeing. An IDF soldier was killed in an exchange of fire in Jenin and at least ten members of the security forces were wounded in operations in Jenin and Tulkarm (IDF Spokesperson and Israeli media, August 28 – September 1, 2024). The operations were reportedly launched due to the improvement in IED capabilities after the terrorist attack in Tel Aviv on August 18, 2024, in which an Israeli civilian was wounded in the explosion of a powerful IED carried by a Palestinian terrorist operative from Nablus, and due to the detonation of IEDs against IDF forces and civilians in Judea and Samaria (Israeli media, August 28, 2024). IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevy noted that the activity was intended to prevent an escalation of terrorism in Judea and Samaria. He said the objective was to enter the Palestinian refugee camps, destroy their sabotage capabilities, and thwart terrorist attacks (IDF spokesperson, August 31, 2024). Operation “Summer Camps” On August 28, 2024, the Israeli security forces began a counterterrorism operation in Jenin and its environs. The activity began in the eastern neighborhood of Jenin and the Kasbah and later expanded to the Jenin refugee camp. The forces also operated in the Qabatiya and al-Sila al-Harithiya areas (IDF Spokesperson and Israeli media, August 28-September 1, 2024). During the operation, the forces killed at least 18 terrorist operatives. On August 30, 2024, Israeli security forces killed the head of a Hamas network in Jenin, Wissam Hazem, in an airstrike on a vehicle in the Jenin area. Two other Hamas operatives, Maysara Masharqa and Arafat Amer, who were involved in shooting attacks targeting Israeli communities in the Seam Zone, were also killed in the attack. Rifles, a handgun, magazines, IEDs, and gas grenades were found in the car, as well as tens of thousands of shekels intended to finance terrorism (IDF Spokesperson, August 30, 2024). Hamas’ military wing confirmed that “commander” Wissam Ayman Hazem from the Jenin refugee camp was killed, along with Maysara al-Masharqa and Arafat al-Amer, in a clash with the Israeli security forces in the town of al-Zababdeh, east of Jenin (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 30, 2024).       Right: The weapons and money discovered in the vehicle (IDF Spokesperson, August 30, 2024). Left: Hamas notice of the deaths of Hazem, al-Masharqa, and al-Amer (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 30, 2024) The al-Nasser Salah al-Din Brigades, the military wing of the Popular Resistance Committees, announced the death of the commander of the battalions in Jenin, Ahmed Hussein Turkman, in a clash with the Israeli security forces in the Jenin district. He was allegedly responsible for several “heroic missions,” including setting fires near the Etzion camp on June 28, 2024 (al-Aqsa TV Telegram channel, August 29, 2024). The Palestinian armed networks, led by the Jenin Battalion of the al-Quds Brigades of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), claimed responsibility for carrying out ambushes, shooting at the Israeli security forces, and detonating IEDs (Quds News Agency, August 28-September 1, 2024). On August 31, 2024, an IDF soldier was killed and another was wounded in an exchange of fire in Jenin. The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades announced that their fighters had set a precise ambush on an Israeli infantry force in the al-Damaj neighborhood of Jenin (al-Arabi, August 31, 2024). It was also reported that for the first time, an RPG rocket was used in fighting against the Israeli security forces in Jenin (Nablus Battalions Telegram channel, August 31, 2024). The Palestinian media reported that at least 17 Palestinians had been killed in the Jenin area since the beginning of the Israeli operation (Wafa, September 1, 2024). Jenin Mayor Nidal Obeidi claimed that the damage after four days of activity had reached NIS 50 million (Fajr News, August 31, 2024). The Jenin municipality claimed that more than 70 percent of the city’s streets had been destroyed and that water had been cut off to 80 percent of the city and the refugee camp (Wafa, August 31, 2024). Operation “Ir Shemesh” Between August 28 and August 30, 2024, Israeli security forces operated in the Nur Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm. The forces killed five terrorist operatives and detained six wanted persons, located and destroyed dozens of IEDs planted on traffic routes. A suspicious vehicle was identified near the government hospital in Tulkarm, containing an M-16 rifle and a large quantity of weapons (IDF Spokesperson, August 31, 2024). On August 29, 2024, Israeli security forces killed five terrorist operatives hiding in a mosque. Among those killed was Muhammad Jaber, aka Abu Shuja, PIJ Tulkarm Battalion commander in Nur Shams, who was responsible for many attacks, including the shooting attack in which an Israeli civilian was killed in Qalqilya on June 22, 2024. A SWAT soldier sustained minor injuries. Jaber managed to evade Israeli targeted killing attempts and detention attempts by the Palestinian security services several times (IDF Spokesperson and Israeli media, August 29, 2024). The PIJ announced that Jaber, commander of the Tulkarm Battalion and one of its early founders, had been killed along with “some of his brothers after a heroic confrontation with the occupation soldiers” (Quds News Agency Telegram channel, August 29, 2024). Hamas’ military wing announced that one of its operatives, Muhammad Tawfiq Ofi, from the Tulkarm refugee camp, had been killed along with Jaber (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 30, 2024). PIJ announcement of Jaber’s death (PIJ Tulkarm Battalion Telegram channel, August 29, 2024) The Palestinian media reported five fatalities in the activity of the Israeli security forces in Tulkarm (Wafa, September 1, 2024). After Israeli forces entered the Nur Shams refugee camp, electricity was reportedly cut off, and internet and water networks were damaged. It is also claimed that 30 percent of the residents had left for nearby villages (Radio Alam, August 28, 2024). The head of the Popular Committee in the Nur Shams camp claimed that 35 buildings had been completely destroyed and that 120 structures had been partially damaged (al-Aqsa Radio Telegram channel, August 30, 2024). Operation “Olim Kita” On August 29, 2024, Israeli security forces completed a 30-hour operation in the al-Far’a refugee camp in the northern Jordan Valley. During the operation, the forces surrounded the camp and located an IED laboratory and an operations room operating from a mosque, where ready-to-use IEDs and large quantities of weapons were discovered. In addition, four terrorist operatives were killed (IDF Spokesperson and Israeli media, August 29, 2024). The Palestinians reported four fatalities in the Tubas area (Wafa, September 1, 2024). Hamas expressed sorrow over the deaths of Ibrahim Abd al-Qader al-Ghanimi, Murad Masoud al-Ja’aita, Ahmad Saleh al-Nabzizi, and a 14-year-old boy named Muhammad Masoud al-Ja’aita (Hamas Telegram channel, August 28, 2024). Tubas Governor Ahmed As’ad claimed that Israeli forces “deliberately destroyed the infrastructure” during the operation (Sabak24 News Agency Telegram channel, August 30, 2024). Israeli forces allegedly surrounded houses and demanded that those inside surrender. It was also alleged that the forces raided the Red Crescent medical point in the camp, attacked the staff, and seized their phones (Radio Alam, August 29, 2024).     Right: An operations room located in the mosque (IDF Spokesperson, August 28, 2024). Left: IDF forces in the al-Far’a camp (IDF Spokesperson, August 29, 2024) Terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria during IDF operations On the night of August 30-31, 2024, a car bomb exploded at a gas station at the Gush Etzion junction. The terrorist driving the car then tried to attack the Israeli security forces, who responded by shooting and killing him. Three officers sustained minor to moderate injuries. At the same time, a terrorist driving a car bomb infiltrated the community of Karmei Tzur. The community’s security guard crashed into the vehicle and killed the terrorist with gunfire. During the exchange of fire, the IED exploded in the car bomb. There were no casualties (IDF Spokesperson, August 31, 2024). The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claimed responsibility for the double attack, reporting that the perpetrators were Zuhdi Nidal Abu Afifa and Mohammad Ihsan Marqa (al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades Telegram channel, September 1, 2024). Hamas’ military wing also announced that the perpetrators of the double attack were its operatives, with Mohammad Ihsan Marqa detonating the car bomb at the gas station and Zuhdi Nidal Abu Afifa detonating the car in Karmei Tzur (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, September 2, 2024). On September 1, 2024, a drive-by shooting was carried out at a police car on Route 35, near the Tarqumiya checkpoint in the South Hebron Hills. Three Israeli policemen were killed. A few hours later, Israeli security forces located the perpetrator, Muhannad al-Aswad, inside a building in Hebron and killed him after an exchange of fire. An M-16 rifle was discovered next to him. Al-Aswad, a resident of the town of Idhna, was reportedly a Fatah operative and previously served in the presidential guard of the Palestinian Authority (IDF spokesperson, September 1, 2024). The Palestinian media confirmed that Muhannad al-Aswad, a resident of the town of Idhna, had carried out the shooting attack and that he had served in the presidential guard until 2015 before he began working as an electrical contractor (Palestinian Media Center Telegram channel, September 1, 2024). The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claimed responsibility, noting that the perpetrator of the attack was Muhannad Muhammad al-Aswad, from the town of Idhna. According to the announcement, the attack was “revenge for the blood of the shaheeds and within the framework of the responsibility of retaliating for the Zionist massacres in the Gaza Strip, for the crimes of the occupation in the occupied West Bank, and for the ongoing violations against al-Aqsa Mosque headed by the criminal Ben Gvir” (al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades Telegram channel, September 2, 2024). The scene of the shooting attack near the Tarqumiya checkpoint (Israel Police X account, September 1, 2024) In the early morning hours of September 2, 2024, a report was received of a suspicious vehicle near the community of Ateret in the Binyamin area, north of Ramallah. IDF forces and sappers searched the vehicle. Two gas canisters connected to an operating mechanism were discovered inside (IDF Spokesperson, Israel Police X account, and Israeli Media, September 2, 2024). Palestinian reactions to the IDF activity In their comments, Palestinian officials condemned the IDF activity in northern Samaria and accused Israel of trying to carry out “genocide” and “cleansing” in Judea and Samaria similar to the Gaza Strip. Residents were called upon to “resist” the Israeli forces. The following are notable comments: Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas cut short his visit to Saudi Arabia in view of the beginning of Israeli activity. Nabil Abu Rudeineh, spokesman for Mahmoud Abbas’s office, said that the Israeli actions “will lead to severe consequences that will be paid for by everyone” and that “they are the continuation of an all-out war on the Palestinian people” (Wafa, August 28, 2024). Hamas said the Israeli operations were “a practical attempt to implement the plans of the extremist government and expand the brutal war of extermination in the Gaza Strip to all cities, towns, and refugee camps in the West Bank” (Hamas Telegram channel, August 28, 2024). The PIJ claimed that “the objective of the attack is to shift the weight of the conflict to the West Bank, in an attempt to impose a new reality on the ground that is intended to subdue and annex the West Bank” (Safa News Agency Telegram channel, August 28, 2024).  Palestinian social media featured posts and cartoons expressing support for the “resistance” in Judea and Samaria, drawing connections between the war in the Gaza Strip and the “resistance” in Judea and Samaria, particularly in Jenin (a name that means “embryo” in Arabic). Right: The “resistance” in Judea and Samaria “smashes” the Israeli rifle (Emad Hajjaj’s Instagram account, September 2024). Center: Jenin as a womb for the “resistance” (Mohammad Sabaaneh’s Instagram account, September 1, 2024). Left: “Gaza and the West Bank, the wound is one,” cartoon of Mahmoud Abbas (Quds News Agency Telegram channel, August 28, 2024) Processes and trends in terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria during 2024 Hamas and Iran are working to ignite Judea and Samaria Since the beginning of the Iron Swords War on October 7, 2023, the Hamas leadership has been working to ignite Judea and Samaria by carrying out terrorist attacks, including inside Israeli territory, and clashes with the Israeli security forces.[2] The effort is led by Zaher Jabarin, who has served as Hamas’ de facto head of Judea and Samaria since his predecessor, Salah al-Arouri, deputy chairman of Hamas’ political bureau, was killed in an attack attributed to Israel in Beirut on January 2, 2024. Following are prominent statements by Jabarin: On April 11, 2024, he called on the residents of Judea and Samaria to “rise up against the occupier and confront him with all your might.” He added that “the residents of the West Bank must continue on the path of resistance” and that “the West Bank is the heart of the battle and the conflict with the enemy” (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, April 11, 2024). On July 25, 2024, in an interview with al-Jazeera, he said that “the West Bank is the soft underbelly of the occupation” and that “the West Bank has a pool of struggle and jihad.” He said, “All the resistance groups on the ground are coordinated and most of them are coordinated and cooperating” and called on all Palestinians to “be involved in the inevitable confrontation” (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, July 25, 2024). Zaher Jabarin (Quds News Agency, January 3, 2024) Concurrently with the public statements, activity was identified on the ground of Hamas’ “West Bank Headquarters” from the Gaza Strip and Turkey to transfer funds to terrorist operatives in Judea and Samaria and carry out terrorist attacks from Judea and Samaria (ISA Spokesperson’s Unit, May 31, 2024). In addition, several terrorist attacks that were in the planning stages were thwarted: Anas Shurman, a Palestinian from Tulkarm who lives in Jordan, was detained in Nablus on suspicion of planning a bombing attack on Israeli territory. The interrogation revealed that he was recruited to Hamas in December 2023 by Imad Obeid, a Hamas operative from Turkey, and agreed to carry out a suicide bombing attack on behalf of Hamas. In addition, several Hamas operatives who belonged to the network in Nablus and were involved in preparing the IED for the attack were detained (ISA Spokesperson’s Unit, June 3, 2024). The Israeli security forces detained a squad of students in a Hamas cell at Birzeit University who were planning to carry out an attack. The interrogation revealed that the suspects acted on behalf of Hamas headquarters in Turkey to provide an infrastructure for activity against Israelis and were engaged in preparing to carry out an attack and transferring money to operatives on the ground. All the suspects were detained, and weapons and large sums of money transferred from Hamas headquarters were found in their possession (ISA Spokesperson’s Unit and Israeli media, July 21, 2024). Iran is working intensively to smuggle weapons and money and carry out terrorist attacks from Judea and Samaria using the IRGC’s Qods Force, to ignite and launch a campaign against Israel from this sector as well, alongside the Gaza Strip and the other fronts of the “axis of resistance.”[3] In recent years, senior IRGC officials have publicly addressed the expansion of the “Palestinian resistance” in Judea and Samaria and the growing challenges facing Israel and the IDF in this arena, and attempts to establish Iranian intelligence infrastructure in Israel and Judea and Samaria, establish terrorist infrastructure under the guise of civilian organizations, and transfer explosives by UAVs have been exposed, including after the outbreak of the Iron Swords War. In March 2024, it was revealed that a large quantity of weapons smuggled into Judea and Samaria had been seized, including fragmentation charges, anti-tank mines, shoulder-fired anti-tank missiles, RPG rockets, and explosives (IDF Spokesperson, March 25, 2024). The activity is led by Munir al-Maqdah, a Fatah operative from Lebanon who works in the service of the Qods Force and Hezbollah together with his brother, Khalil al-Maqdah, who was killed in an Israeli attack in Sidon on August 21, 2024 (ISA Spokesperson’s Unit, August 21, 2024). Perpetrators of the terrorist attacks Terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria is usually carried out by the military wings of the “established” organizations – Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the PIJ’s al-Quds Brigades, and Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. However, there are local networks in which operatives from several organizations collaborate, both in fighting against the Israeli security forces in the communities and in the refugee camps and in carrying out terrorist attacks.[4] In addition, there are inter-regional collaborations between the networks. The following are some examples of collaborations: On the evening of August 18, 2024, a powerful IED exploded on Lehi Street in Tel Aviv. As a result, the terrorist carrying the IED on his back was killed, and an Israeli civilian sustained minor injuries (Israel Police X account and Israeli Media, August 18-19, 2024). The Hamas military wing and the PIJ military wing claimed joint responsibility for carrying out the suicide bombing attack in Tel Aviv (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 19, 2024). Subsequently, Hamas’ military wing announced that the perpetrator of the attack, Ja’far Saad Manna, was its operative (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 22, 2024). On July 27, 2024, Lua’i Masha was killed in an Israeli Air Force airstrike on the Balata refugee camp in Nablus. Both the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and the al-Quds Brigades announced that he was their operative (al-Quds Brigades in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, July 27, 2024). On July 23, 2024, the Israeli security forces killed the commander of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in the Tulkarm camp, Ashraf Nafe’, who headed Hamas’ military wing in the camp, Muhammad Awad, commander of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in the camp, and Mohammad Badie, an al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades operative. From right to left: Mohammad Badie, Mohammad Awad, and Ashraf Nafe’ (Quds News Agency Telegram channel, July 23, 2024) On June 22, 2024, an Israeli civilian was shot dead in a shooting attack in Qalqilya. The perpetrators of the attack, Jamal Ibrahim Abu Haniya and Ali Khalil Abu Bakr, were operatives of Hamas’ military wing and were killed in an Israeli Air Force airstrike in Tulkarm on August 3, 2024. Muhammad Jaber (Abu Shuja), who was the head of the network in Nur Shams, directed the attack. On April 12, 2024, Muhammad Omar Daraghmeh, commander of the Tubas Battalion of the al-Quds Brigades, was killed in an Israeli security force operation in Tubas. Daraghmeh was commander of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in Tubas before moving to the Tubas Battalion of the al-Quds Brigades along with operatives of other organizations in the town (al-Jazeera TV website, April 12, 2024). The terrorist networks also use social media, mainly TikTok, WhatsApp, and Telegram, to convey their messages. As a result, the leaders of the networks also become “popular heroes” who receive widespread support. Such an example was on July 26, 2024, when the Palestinian security services tried to detain Muhammad Jaber (Abu Shuja) at the hospital in Tulkarm, but local residents clashed with the security services operatives and Jaber managed to escape to the Nur Shams refugee camp, where he was greeted with cheers (Quds News Agency Telegram channel, July 26, 2024). There is also considerable involvement of operatives of the Palestinian Authority security services in terrorist activity, partly due to Israel’s withholding of funds, which has impacted the salaries of Palestinian Authority employees, including security personnel. On March 28, 2024, three Israeli civilians were wounded in a shooting attack against an Israeli bus and two vehicles on Route 90. The perpetrator of the attack was Abu Rida al-Saadi, a resident of Jenin and an operative in the Palestinian National Security Service; On January 15, 2024, Fares Khalifa, a resident of Tulkarm and a Preventive Intelligence officer, was killed during an exchange of fire with Israeli forces in the Nur Shams refugee camp; On March 27, 2024, Hamza Ararawi from the al-Ein refugee camp in Nablus was killed in an Israeli Air Force airstrike. Ararawi was a policeman in the Palestinian customs police and an operative in the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Characteristics of the terrorist attacks Since the beginning of 2024, terrorist activity has focused on northern Samaria, originating mainly from Jenin and the Jenin refugee camp, Tulkarm and the Nur Shams refugee camp, and Nablus and the Balata refugee camp. There was also an increase in terrorist activity in the Qalqilya and Tubas areas. The most common form of attacks has been shooting attacks and IED attacks. The following are examples of prominent terrorist attacks:[5] On August 12, 2024, an Israeli civilian was seriously wounded by gunfire in a garage in Qalqilya (IDF Spokesperson, August 12, 2024). Hamas’ military wing claimed responsibility for the attack, noting that the perpetrator, Tareq Ziad Daoud, was the commander of Izz al-Din al-Qassam in the Qalqilya district (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 12, 2024). On the afternoon of August 11, 2024, a drive-by shooting targeted Israeli vehicles at the Mehola junction in the Jordan Valley. An Israeli civilian was killed and another was moderately wounded. The Israeli security forces searched for the perpetrators (IDF Spokesperson and Israeli media, August 11, 2024). The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in Judea and Samaria claimed responsibility for the shooting attack (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 11, 2024). On July 23, 2024, two Israeli Defense Ministry contract workers were wounded in an IED explosion near the fence in the Seam Zone, near the community of Merav. Hamas’ military wing in Jenin claimed responsibility for the attack, claiming that three IEDs had been activated against Israeli security forces (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, July 23, 2024). On April 27, 2024, Palestinian terrorist operatives fired at the Salem camp (northwest of Jenin). An IDF force killed two of the attackers and the rest fled the scene. Two M-16 rifles used by the terrorists were found at the site (IDF spokesperson, April 27, 2024). Another prominent feature of terrorist activity in northern Judea and Samaria was planting powerful IEDs under and alongside traffic routes in Palestinian communities and refugee camps to target Israeli security forces. The following are notable cases: On the night of June 26-27, 2024, an IDF soldier was killed and 16 others were wounded in an operation in Jenin when two IEDs planted deep underground exploded. The PIJ’s Jenin Battalion claimed responsibility (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, June 27, 2024; Jenin Battalion Telegram channel, June 27, 2024). On July 1, 2024, an IDF soldier was killed and an officer was wounded when an IED detonated against an armored military vehicle exploded in an operation at Nur Shams camp in Tulkarm. The Tulkarm Battalion of the al-Quds Brigades claimed responsibility (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, July 1, 2024; Tulkarm Battalion Telegram channel, July 1, 2024). In addition, there was increasing terrorist activity in the Seam Zone, mainly in the Tulkarm area. The activity was characterized mainly by attempts to carry out shooting attacks against Israeli communities, but in most cases, there were no casualties or damage. Here are some notable examples: On July 23, 2024, Israeli security forces located rockets inside a vehicle in the Tulkarm refugee camp, along with explosives and IEDs. According to “sources” in the Palestinian security services, PIJ operatives tried to launch rockets at Israel from the Tulkarm area but failed. The Palestinian security service personnel located the launcher (Israeli media, July 23, 2024). On June 23, 2024, shots were fired at the Israeli community of Bat Hefer from the Tulkarm area, after which two IEDs exploded near the wall separating the communities (Israeli media, June 23, 2024). The IDF Spokesperson said an IED had exploded from the Palestinian side of the Seam Zone, hundreds of meters from the wall, to draw the Israeli security forces to the scene. There were no casualties and no damage was reported (IDF Spokesperson’s website, June 24, 2024). The Tulkarm Battalion of the PIJ’s military wing claimed that its operatives had ambushed IDF forces in Bat Hefer and detonated remote-controlled IEDs against them (Tulkarm Battalion of the al-Quds Brigades Telegram channel, June 24, 2024). On the night of June 3-4, 2024, two armed terrorist operatives were identified approaching the fence in an attempt to carry out a shooting attack against Israeli communities. IDF soldiers killed them (IDF Spokesperson’s website, June 4, 2024). On May 29, 2024, three Hamas operatives from the Tulkarm refugee camp documented themselves firing at the community of Bat Hefer (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in the Tulkarm refugee camp Telegram channel, May 29, 2024). The Israeli security forces detained Omar Nasr Allah, from the Tulkarm refugee camp, who admitted that he was a member of a terrorist squad that carried out shooting attacks at Israeli communities near the fence (IDF Spokesperson, June 26, 2024). Izz al-Din al-Qassam operatives document themselves allegedly shooting at Bat Hefer (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in the Tulkarm refugee camp Telegram channel, May 29, 2024) The terrorist activity in southern Judea and Samaria focuses on the Hebron area, including perpetrators of terrorist attacks inside Israel. The following are prominent incidents (apart from the terrorist attacks on August 31 and September 1, 2024): On July 31, 2024, an Israeli civilian was seriously wounded in a shooting and stabbing attack on Route 60, between Kiryat Arba and the Beit Einun junction (IDF Spokesperson and Israeli media, July 31, 2024). Hamas’ military wing in Hebron claimed responsibility for the shooting attack near Kiryat Arba and for shooting at IDF forces near the Cave of the Patriarchs (Hamas Telegram channel, July 31, 2024). On April 22, 2024, three Israeli civilians were injured in a vehicular ramming attack in Jerusalem. One of two Palestinians in the vehicle attempted to fire an improvised submachine gun but experienced a malfunction. The two were detained a short time later in possession of knives (Israel Police Force Spokesperson’s Unit, April 22, 2024). The Palestinian media reported that the perpetrators of the attack were Hatem al-Qawasmeh and Mu’tazz Abu Gholmeh, residents of Hebron and sons of well-known families in Hamas’ military wing (Ma’an, April 22, 2024). On January 15, 2024, a combined vehicular and stabbing attack was carried out in Ra’anana, in which a woman was killed and about 20 others were wounded (Israeli media, January 15, 2024). The perpetrators of the attack were Mahmoud Ali Zidat and Ahmad Muhammad Ali Zidat, relatives from Bani Na’im, east of Hebron, who were in Israel without permits (Ma’an, January 15, 2024). The post Escalation and Thwarting of Terrorism in Northern Samaria appeared first on The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

The post Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (August 20-27, 2024) appeared first on The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

Overview[1] On August 29, 2024, an editorial in the ISIS al-Nabā’ weekly called on Muslims in Europe to carry out “lone wolf” attacks on Jews and Christians in retaliation for the war in the Gaza Strip and European governmental support for Israel. The editorial was published in the wake of two terrorist attacks, one in Germany and the other Russia, for which ISIS claimed responsibility, stating they were carried out “to avenge the Muslims in Palestine.” Editorial Encourages Terrorist Attacks in Europe On August 29, 2024, Issue #458 of ISIS’ weekly al-Nabā’ magazine published an editorial entitled “Jihad in Europe” calling for lone wolf attacks on Jews and Christians in Europe. It came after two attacks in Germany and Russia on August 23, 2024, for which ISIS claimed responsibility, relating them to the war in the Gaza Strip (see Appendices A and B for information about the attacks). The article said the following (al-Nabā’, August 29, 2024): Protests and demonstrations in Europe against Western governments which support Israel are ineffective. The most effective mode of action is to carry out jihad “lone wolf” attacks on Jews and Christians (“Crusaders”), especially in support of Muslims who are unable to wage jihad” in “Palestine.” The attacks in Germany and Russia were in revenge for harm done to Muslims in “Palestine,” Iraq, Syria, Bosnia and other places, and prove that Muslims are united and determined to avenge their religious brothers without national or other differences. Muslims are called on to attack Jewish neighborhoods, synagogues and pubs [sic], to kill and burn the Jews. Jews and Christians in Europe can be attacked with simple weapons such knives and hammers, since local security personnel find it difficult to identity and investigate that type of attack. The article criticized Arab regimes which protect their Jews and Christians. The article “Jihad in Europe” (al-Nabā’, August 29, 2024) Appendix A: Stabbing in Germany Late in the evening on August 23, 2024, a terrorist carried out a stabbing in Solingen, a city in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia in northwestern Germany. The attack was carried out during a festival marking the 650th anniversary of the founding of the city. The attacker stabbed random festival participants and then fled. Three people were murdered and eight injured, four of them seriously (Reuters, August 24, 2024). A few hours later the terrorist turned himself in to the police. He was identified as Issa al-Hassan, 26 years old, a Syrian who had arrived in Germany in December 2022 and requesting asylum. He was supposed to be deported to Bulgaria, but German immigration authorities were unable to locate him at the refugee center where he was staying (Reuters, DW and AFP, August 26, 2024). ISIS’s A’maq news agency issued a statement claiming responsibility for the attack. It stated that the stabber was an ISIS operative and had carried out the attack “as revenge for the Muslims in Palestine and everywhere” (A’maq, Telegram, August 24, 2024). A’maq claim of responsibility (Telegram, August 24, 2024) According to the editorial about the attack in al-Nabā’ Issue #458, it was carried out against “the Christians of crusading Europe as revenge for the Muslims in Palestine.” It stated that the A’maq agency had issued a video in which the terrorist said, “the action is revenge for the Muslims, especially after the recent massacres in Palestine, which were carried out with the help of Crusaders.” It accused the European countries of having committed crimes against Muslims in Bosnia, Palestine, Syria and Iraq, adding, “Do you think you will be spared [revenge]? By Allah, I will chop off your limbs with the help of Allah, may he be praised and exalted. I embarked on this action to please Allah, may he be praised and exalted, to take revenge for our people in Palestine, against whom massacres are being committed by the Jews. I will hack off their limbs as revenge for our people in Palestine and our people in Syria, Iraq, Bosnia and Afghanistan.” According to the editorial, Germany is one of the most supportive countries of Israel and plays a key role in the international coalition against ISIS (al- Nabā’, August 29, 2024). The editorial about the terrorist attack in Germany (al-Nabā’, August 29, 2024) Appendix B: ISIS Attack in a Russian Prison On August 23, 2024, four prisoners affiliated with ISIS attacked prison staff in Volgograd, in southwestern Russia, with knives, held them hostage and killed four of them. The terrorists, from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, were shot dead by Russian security force snipers. According to reports, one of the attackers was wearing an explosive belt but did not have time to activate it (Reuters, Tass and NBC, August 23, 2024). ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack and said the hostages were stabbed to death by knives smuggled into the prison compound, adding that one of the dead was a senior officer. The al-Nabā’ article stated that the four had received religious instruction inside the prison which “strengthened their faith.” It also stated that al-Nabā’ had received a video from the planner of the attack, in which he called on the Muslims to “take revenge on the Jews for the massacres they commit in Palestine,” adding that “we see how the Jews, the enemies of Allah, kill the Muslim women and their children” and “the crimes of the Russian Crusader against the Muslims in Syria, and especially against the pious women [of ISIS operatives] in the prisons” (al-Nabā’, August 29, 2024). Two of the terrorists in the prison in Volgograd, with an improvised ISIS flag hanging on the wall behind them (al-Nabā’, August 29, 2024) The post ISIS calls for jihad in Europe to avenge Muslim deaths in the Gaza Strip appeared first on The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

Highlights[1] Senior Iranian officials condemned the IDF’s activity in Judea and Samaria and accused Israel of striving to expand the scope of the “killings and crimes” against the Palestinians. Senior Iranian officials continued to threaten to respond to the killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran but stressed that the response would be calculated and would not play into Israel’s hands. The defense ministers of Iran and Syria discussed expanding cooperation between the two countries, including against Israel. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met in Tehran with Hezbollah’s representative in Iran. The meeting took place as part of the new foreign minister’s ongoing efforts to reaffirm Iran’s continued support for its proxies amidst the backdrop of the change of government in Tehran. The United Kingdom imposed new sanctions on Qods Force’s Unit 700 and three IRGC members for their involvement in destabilizing activities in the region and Britain. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for two drone attacks against targets in the Haifa area. The IDF Spokesperson reported the downing of UAVs approaching Israel from the direction of Syria and the east. The Houthis claimed responsibility for two attacks against vessels in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Hits were reported, but there were no casualties. There are delays at the start of the rescue operation of the tanker MV Sounion, which is on fire in the Red Sea after being hit in a Houthi attack. According to the Houthi leader, preparations are ongoing for a retaliation against Israel, and the Houthis also intend to increase their activities in support of the Palestinians. Iranian involvement in the Palestinian arena Mohammad Bagheri, chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, said at a ceremony to introduce the new deputy chief of staff that the “Zionist regime” is in existential danger and is therefore determined to continue its crimes. He noted that even the Americans are hesitant whether to support Israel in view of the dangerous conditions in which it finds itself. Referring to the killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Bagheri said Iran would definitely respond in a calculated manner to the “crimes of the Zionist regime” (snn.ir, August 28, 2024). Iranian Chief of Staff Mohammad Bagheri (snn.ir, August 28, 2024) General Mohsen Chizari, IRGC Qods Force deputy operations chief, said the “waiting period” for retaliation for Haniyeh’s killing could be long and would occur “only when the conditions are right.” Chizari stressed that how the retaliation would be carried out “will depend on the circumstances that will lead to the achievement of the goal,” adding that “this time, the retaliation will be different, and we will not reveal its method” (al-Jazeera, September 4, 2024). Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam, the president of Tehran’s Supreme National Defense University and former commander of the law enforcement forces, referred to Iran’s possible response to Haniyeh’s killing, saying that Iran would respond wisely, taking into account the complex developments and equations and in a way that would not play into the hands of the “enemy.” Referring to Hezbollah’s retaliation for the killing of Fuad Shukr, the organization’s military commander, Ahmadi-Moqaddam said the organization had inflicted “lethal blows” on the “Zionist regime,” which it hid. He added that keeping the “Zionist regime” in fear was no less significant than a military attack and that it had negative strategic implications for Israel (Khabar Online, September 2, 2024). Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanani condemned the IDF’s activity in Judea and Samaria.[2] He said the activity was a continuation of the “genocide” carried out by Israel in the Gaza Strip and proved that it sought to expand the scope of the killings and crimes against the Palestinian residents. Kanani praised the “steadfastness” of the Palestinian people and the “resistance groups” against “the killing machine of the criminal Zionist regime in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.” He called on the international community, especially the UN Security Council, to fulfill their responsibility and take immediate and effective action to stop the “genocide of the Palestinian people by the Zionist regime” (Iranian Foreign Ministry website, August 29, 2024). Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi spoke with his Jordanian counterpart, Ayman al-Safadi, to discuss bilateral issues and developments in the Palestinian arena. Araghchi accused Israel of being the main factor preventing a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and increasing tensions in the region and stressed the need for action by the international community to stop the “genocide” in the Gaza Strip. He added that Iran would support any agreement acceptable to the people and the “resistance” in “Palestine” (Iranian Foreign Ministry website, August 30, 2024). Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi accused Israel of pushing the region to the brink of a dangerous crisis, continuing its “crimes” in the Gaza Strip and sending its “killing machine” to Judea and Samaria. He noted that if Prime Minister Netanyahu’s supporters in the West failed to curb the continuation of Israel’s “criminal provocations,” they would share responsibility for their consequences (Abbas Araghchi’s X account, September 2, 2024). Iranian involvement in Lebanon and Syria Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh spoke with Syrian Defense Minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas and stressed Iran’s support for Syria’s security and territorial integrity. He called for the implementation of the agreements signed between the two countries and the expansion of cooperation between them, which, he claimed, would lead to the defeat of the “Zionist regime.” The Syrian defense minister stressed the need for continued cooperation between Iran, Syria, and the “axis of resistance” against Israel (Fars, September 1, 2024). The defense ministers of Iran (right) and Syria (Fars, September 1, 2024) The IRGC has begun constructing a network of tunnels around Damascus International Airport to link its headquarters to its weapons depots. According to a report by a Syrian news channel, over 50 IRGC members and around 30 members of the Syrian regime have been recruited to participate in the excavation operations on the outskirts of the airport. In addition, Iranian engineers specializing in tunneling and fortifications have been brought in to design the plans and oversee the work. The tunnels are reportedly being equipped with spaces designated for storing weapons and housing advanced air defense systems (Ayn al-Furat, August 31, 2024). On September 1, 2024, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met in Tehran with Hezbollah’s representative to Iran, Abdullah Safieddine, to discuss the latest developments in the region, especially in Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, Judea, and Samaria. Araghchi stressed Iran’s continued support for the “resistance” and the struggles of the peoples of the region against the “Zionist occupation.” Safieddine conveyed to Araghchi the congratulations of Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah and other senior members of the organization on his appointment as foreign minister (Iranian Foreign Ministry website, September 1, 2024). The Iranian foreign minister meets with Hezbollah’s representative in Tehran (Iranian Foreign Ministry website, September 1, 2024) UK sanctions against the IRGC On September 2, 2024, the United Kingdom’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) and Treasury imposed new sanctions on individuals and entities linked to the Iranian government for hostile activities by Iran and its proxies in the region. The sanctions were imposed on the IRGC Qods Force’s Unit 700, which is responsible for transferring equipment and supplies to pro-Iranian militias in the region, as well as three IRGC members: Abdolfattah Ahvazian, Behnam Shahriari, and Mohammad Fazeli, accused of supporting actions by Iran and its proxies aimed at destabilizing Britain, Israel, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon (United Kingdom government website, September 2, 2024). Following the United Kingdom’s decision to impose the sanctions, the United Kingdom ambassador to Tehran was summoned for a reprimand at the Iranian Foreign Ministry (ISNA, September 3, 2024). Activities of the Shiite militias Iraq Claims of responsibility of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq This week, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for two attacks against targets in Israel (Islamic Resistance in Iraq Telegram channel, August 28-September 4, 2024). The targets of the attacks were the following: September 4, 2024 – Haifa Port, using UAVs. The IDF Spokesperson said air defense fighters had successfully intercepted a UAV that was making its way into Israeli territory from the east. The UAV did not cross into Israeli territory and there were no casualties (IDF Spokesperson, September 4, 2024). August 29, 2024 – “Alon Tavor power station in the Haifa area”, using UAVs. According to the IDF Spokesperson, air defense fighters successfully intercepted a UAV that was making its way into Israeli territory from the direction of Syria. The UAV did not penetrate Israel and there were no casualties (IDF Spokesperson, August 29, 2024). Attacks against American targets in Iraq A “source” in the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee said that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq would continue to attack American interests in Iraq. He reiterated the warning that the soldiers at the American bases “will soon return to the United States in coffins” (shahokurdy X account, August 31, 2024). According to a senior Iraqi militia official, the lull between the militias and the American forces in Iraq is temporary, and they are waiting for Iran’s retaliation for the killing of Ismail Haniyeh to continue operations against the American forces (1news-iq.com, August 30, 2024). Coordination between the militias in Iraq and the Houthis Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq’s secretary-general Qais al-Khazali met in his office in Baghdad with the Yemeni cleric Mohammed Abdul-Adhim al-Hassan al-Houthi al-Hasani. The meeting was also attended by Abu Idris al-Sharafi, the Houthi representative in Iraq. Al-Khazali expressed his great appreciation for the heroism and courage displayed by the Yemeni people and for the Houthis’ role in supporting the Palestinian people and standing up against “the massacres of the Zionists in the Gaza Strip.” Al-Hasani praised al-Khazali for “embodying the ‘resistance’ concept of the unity of the arenas” (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq website, September 1, 2024). The meeting between Qais al-Khazali and Mohammed Abdul-Adhim al-Hassan al-Houthi al-Hasani (Hossein Ali al-Houthi’s X account, September 2, 2024) Hadi al-Amiri, secretary-general of the Badr Organization, said the United States was unable to stop Houthi operations in the Red Sea and that the path of the “Islamic resistance” was clear and honorable (Shafaq News, September 3, 2024). Yemen Houthi military activity Over the past week, the Houthis continued to report attacks against vessels. Houthi armed forces spokesman Yahya Saria reported on the attacks (Yahya Saria’s X account, August 28 – September 4, 2024): August 31, 2024: An attack on the ship Groton in the Gulf of Aden. According to Saria, the hit was accurate. He said it was the second attack on the ship, which had already been attacked on August 3, 2024. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) confirmed that the ship Groton reported that two missiles exploded near the vessel, but no damage or casualties were reported (UKMTO X account, August 31, 2024). September 2, 2024: An attack on the ship Blue Lagoon 1 in the Red Sea, using several missiles and UAVs. Saria claimed the hit was accurate. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated that the Houthis attacked the Greek-owned MV BLUE LAGOON I and Saudi-owned MV AMJAD oil tankers using two ballistic missiles and a UAV and hit both. CENTCOM warned that the hits on the tankers posed a threat to marine environmental systems, in addition to endangering the lives of sailors (CENTCOM X account, September 3, 2024). The company operating the tanker, Bahri, announced that it was not attacked but was near Blue Lagoon 1 during the attack and was not damaged (Seatrade Maritime News, September 4, 2024). A “Houthi maritime source” also denied hitting a Saudi vessel (Al-Akhbar, September 3, 2024). CENTCOM reported that during the past week, they destroyed four UAVs, a USV, and four missile launch systems in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen (CENTCOM X account, August 28-September 4, 2024). Attack on the oil tanker MV Sounion On August 29, 2024, Houthi forces released a video that they claimed documented a raid by Houthi fighters on the oil tanker MV Sounion, which was first attacked on August 21, 2024. The footage shows the tanker bridge from the inside and other rooms in the vessel, as well as planting explosive devices on board and detonating them from a distance. It should be noted that the documentation of the detonation of the IEDs is not the one released by the Houthis on August 23, 2024. In the new documentation, there appear to be fire sites on board the tanker, indicating that the fighters raided the tanker after it had already been severely damaged and abandoned in the previous days (the Houthi armed forces’ media arm X account, August 29, 2024). On August 28, 2024, Houthi spokesman Mohammad Abdeslam said that following requests from several “parties,” the Houthis approved towing the tanker to safety. He noted that the attack on the tanker was an example of “Yemen’s seriousness to attack any ship that violates Yemen’s decision to prevent the passage of ships destined for Israel” (Mohammad Abdeslam’s X account, August 28, 2024). Houthi political council member Mohammad Ali al-Houthi issued a statement saying, “We hold America and Britain responsible for any oil spill from the Sounion, even if it occurs while it is being towed, for reasons that we will explain if necessary” (Mohammad Ali al-Houthi’s X account, September 1, 2024). On September 2, 2024, the European Union Red Sea Task Force announced that private companies were involved in efforts to tow the MV Sounion from its location and that the operation would begin soon. It was also reported that the European task force would secure the towing operation. Regarding the condition of the tanker, it was reported that several fire sites were still burning on board, but it was not drifting and there was no oil spill (EU Task Force EUNAVFOR Aspides X account, September 2, 2024). However, on September 3, 2024, the task force reported that the private companies had concluded that the conditions required to tow the tanker had not yet been met and that it was not safe to move forward. Therefore, it was decided to examine alternative solutions (EU Task Force EUNAVFOR Aspides X account, September 3, 2024).     Photos from the video that allegedly documented the raid and the detonation of IEDs aboard the oil tanker Sounion (the Houthi armed forces’ media arm X account, August 29, 2024) Statements by senior Houthi officials On August 29, 2024, the leader of Yemen’s Houthi movement, Abd al-Malik al-Houthi, delivered his weekly speech, in which he said that “preparations for a response against the Israeli enemy are continuing and the time will be a surprise.” He added that they were also “working hard to increase operational activity supporting Palestine to a more significant level,” and clarified that “we have no political ceiling and no other considerations that could affect the level of our actions supporting the Gaza Strip.” Al-Houthi claimed that at least 40% of shipping traffic to Eilat had been halted due to the complete closure of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait to the “enemy.” However, he also admitted that damage to vessels in the Red Sea had become rarer because the number of ships “linked to the enemies” had been greatly reduced. According to him, the shipping companies transported the vessels over vast distances from Yemen, bearing extremely high costs. Regarding the attack on the oil tanker Sounion, al-Houthi said it was a “daring and courageous operation” and that two different forces raided the tanker and detonated IEDs on board (al-Masirah, August 30, 2024). The Houthis’ political bureau issued a statement expressing “great concern over the military escalation and aggression of the Israeli enemy in the West Bank and its invasion of refugee camps.” The announcement also praised “the unity of the Palestinian resistance, which is in a period of perfection and coordination” (al-Masirah, August 31, 2024). The post Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (August 28 – September 4 , 2024) appeared first on The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

Overview[1] During August 2024, the ISIS weekly al-Nabā’ published two editorials referring to Hamas in connection with the war in the Gaza Strip. ISIS rejected Hamas’ methods, accusing the Sunni movement of cooperating with the Iranian-led Shi’ite axis and stating that the only way to deal with Israel and the Jews was a jihad (according to ISIS’s perception). In ITIC assessment, the editorials are an ISIS attempt to exploit the war in the Gaza Strip, and especially criticism of Hamas, to recruit supporters and operatives. They also indicate ISIS’s fear of Iranian expansion in the region and of its Shi’ite allies. ISIS Relates to the War in the Gaza Strip Since the Hamas attack and massacre against Israel on October 7, 2023, ISIS has found itself in a complex situation. On the one hand, it supports a war of attrition against Israel and against Jews in general;[2] on the other, the war in Gaza is led by ISIS’s bitter rivals, Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, often referred by ISIS as al-Ikhwan al-Murtaddin, the “Apostate Brotherhood;” and Hezbollah, regularly called by ISIS Hizb al-Shaytan, the Party of Satan. Also participating in the war are branches of Iran’s Shi’ite axis, ISIS’s sworn enemies (ISIS considers Shi’ites as infidels and calls them rawafid, “refusers,” a derogatory Sunni term for Shi’ites) In August 2024, al-Nabā’, the ISIS weekly magazine, published two editorials stating the organization’s rejection of Hamas’ methods and actions, and accusing the movement of collaborating with the “Shi’ite axis.” ISIS stated that the only way to deal with Israel and the Jews was by waging jihad and the application of Islamic law (Sharia) according to the organization’s perception. On August 1, 2024, al-Nabā’ Issue #454, published an editorial entitled, “Those who would perish”[3] (al-Nabā’, Telegram, August 1, 2024): Hamas, which cooperates with Iran in the “rejection front”[4] [“resistance axis”[5]], worsens the situation of the Palestinians and causes the destruction of the Gaza Strip while serving Iranians interests. Referring to the killing of Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau (called “tyrant”, “leader of the appeasers” and “icon of polytheistic democracy”), in Tehran on July 31, 2024, the editorial stated it could testify to the fact that Iran was incapable of protecting its proxies, and speculated that Iran was even willing to sacrifice its “tail” [that is, the leader of a proxy] in order to save itself by not getting involved in a comprehensive war. According to the editorial, Haniyeh was loyal to the “axis of reluctance” until his last breach while irritating and annoying the Sunni community, and therefore he received his punishment from Allah. The editorial accused the operatives of the Palestinian organizations loyal to the “axis of reluctance” of destroying the Gaza Strip for the sake of Iranian interests, adding that swallowing Iranian bait brings destruction to the Sunni community, whose members must adhere to Islamic law (Sharia) and their faith. The editorial pointed out that the killing Haniyeh was part of a chain, first Saleh al-‘Arouri, deputy head of Hamas’ political bureau, was killed in Beirut on January 2, 2024 [and then Haniyeh]. According to the article, Iran is not a true partner for the Palestinians, it is incapable of protecting them and is causing their situation to deteriorate. As for Hezbollah (Hizb al-Shaytan, “the party of Satan”), the editorial claimed it did everything in its power to evade and deny its responsibility for the rocket attack which killed the Druze children and youth in Majdal Shams,[6] fearing to violate “the rules the confrontation” and international law, and fearing that blame would tarnish the image of the “resistance axis.” Hezbollah, because of its desire to serve Iranian interests, is prepared for the Gaza Strip to burn to the ground along with all its inhabitants. At the head of the editorial was a picture of Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, in front of Haniyeh’s coffin in Tehran, accompanied by other senior figures of the Iranian regime. “Those who would perish” (al-Nabā’, August 1, 2024) On August 14, 2024, al-Nabā’ Issue #456, published an editorial entitled, “At the time of the massacre,” with a photograph of a rescue worker carrying a girl who was killed in the Gaza Strip (al-Nabā’, August 14, 2024). According to the editorial: No peace settlement or reconciliation with Israel is possible and such a solution will lead to more massacres of Muslims. Every Israeli “act of massacre” in “Palestine” torments hearts, but then people move on to their normal agenda. Neither nationalism, appeasement nor “resistance” [i.e., Hamas and the “resistance axis”] can assuage the Muslims’ pains, the only solution is “divine law” based on jihad in the spirit of [ISIS]. The faithful Muslim should view the “massacres” of the Palestinians as a link in the chain of “massacres” carried out by the “enemies of Islam” against Muslims throughout time and in different places around the world, such as Iraq, Syria, Yemen, etc. The leaders of the Arab countries (“the Arab dictators”) are accused of cooperating with Israel and the United States and defending Israel’s borders. The editorial ends by claiming that when “massacres” are committed against Muslims, the response should be a massacre of “infidels.” “At the time of the massacre” (al-Nabā’, August 14, 2024) The post ISIS’s attitudes towards Hamas according to editorials in recent issues of ISIS’ al-Nabā’ weekly appeared first on The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

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