Politics Trump the Weaver It seems unlikely that Trump’s appointees will be driving the bus. (Xinhua/Hu Yousong via Getty Images) There’s been a goodly amount of wailing and gnashing of teeth in my corner of the world about some of President-elect Donald Trump’s recently announced appointments. Particular dismay has attended those of Rep. Mike Waltz (R-FL) to the position of national security advisor and Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) to the State Department. Both men have voiced hawkish—sometimes very hawkish—sentiments in the past, and the collective feeling among those who feel the United States is overexposed abroad is that these two appointments signify the triumph of zombie Bushism and the War Party. Maybe. I remain unpersuaded. First, a bare political reality has gone unmentioned in these conversations: Rubio and Waltz both backed the once and future president early in the nomination race against Ron DeSantis, the popular governor of their own state. Rubio especially, as a focus of anti-Trump yearning in the ’16 race, could have added heft to the DeSantis insurgency; while I doubt this would have changed the outcome, it could very well have made the journey longer, more expensive, and more acrimonious, leaving the party weaker and less well-funded for the general election. Both men might reasonably expect favors in return. There are a limited number of jobs that are a promotion from a safe Senate seat and influential committee positions. The flip side is that able men who were not loyalists—to take the most prominent example, Elbridge Colby, who was associated with the DeSantis camp—have been shut out. This is just how politics works.  Second, Rubio has shown himself adaptable to the Trump-era line on a variety of policies. (You can read him on a variety of his evolved positions in this excellent little magazine, The American Conservative—well worth a subscription!) I tend to subscribe to the theory that it is in fact the president, Donald Trump, who will be calling the tune and his cabinet that will be dancing; I do not think Rubio will be doing much moonlighting as a warlord, nor do I think he is especially inclined to do so. The thrust of the campaign and early transition has been toward avoiding the establishmentarian frustration of the second-term agenda, as happened in the first term. In the words of the greatest political sage of the 19th century, Humpty-Dumpty, “The question is, which is to be master—that’s all.” I tend to think the master is Trump, not Rubio or Waltz, and that they have been selected in part because they will toe the line. A final point worth considering is Trump’s long-standing affection for the rhetoric of deterrence, for putting on the scary mask and pulling faces. “Fire and fury,” his proudly displayed collection of generals, the occasional punitive barrage of ballistic missiles—this all is of a piece. While Trump has a proven record of avoiding wars, his technique has been to maintain a ferocious aspect. And that is a fairly classical diplomatic tactic; to have an avowed peacenik heading State or NSC is a liability, or at least undercuts a legitimate diplomatic tool, the threat of force.  This is not to say that I am especially infatuated with any of Trump’s appointments—to be infatuated with even a sympathetic politician is to invite sorrow and, worse, embarrassment. I share reservations about the men’s policy commitments. Further, Rubio has no executive experience, and running the Truman Building is a different and far more demanding task than running a Senate office or a presidential campaign. (For one thing, in theory, the staffers in a Senate office or a campaign are on your side.) But my fantasy cabinet has little chance of making it through a Senate confirmation process, and would tend to produce some very hurt feelings among powerful people who helped to put Donald Trump in the White House a second time. You have to dance with the ones that brung you. The master craft to which Plato compares statesmanship is weaving—the artful combination of various individuals into a dynamic but cohesive whole. Trump the weaver has a box of particular threads, each with its particular virtues and vices; he has to bring them together into something resembling a functional government, at least if he is to deliver on his promises and secure a legacy. Not playing the game with supporters in your own party would be a bad start. If Rubio buffaloes us into another Asian land war, I will eat my words and humbly reply to every abusive email I receive with the simple phrase, “I was wrong.” But for now, I am not sweating the appointments frenzy—too much. The post Trump the Weaver appeared first on The American Conservative.

Politics Mr. President-Elect: Save The District From Itself D.C. home rule has been a catastrophe. Credit: image via Shutterstock Nearly 30 years ago, with the District of Columbia facing a record deficit and the designation of its municipal bonds as “junk,” President Bill Clinton created a federal control that which suspended “home rule” for D.C. from 1995 to 2001.  In its place, Clinton appointed a five-member panel to oversee the District’s finances. The panel was granted the power to overrule decisions passed by then-Mayor Marion Barry and the D.C. City Council. Barry decried the power grab as a lawless “dictatorship,” but by 1998 the board, under the leadership of Alice Rivlin, who had served as Clinton OMB Director, had restored the District’s finances. Soon afterwards, it handed power back to recently elected Mayor Anthony Williams. A control board: It is an idea whose time has come again, not least because by any metric the District of Columbia has suffered a precipitous decline in the decade since Muriel Bowser was elected mayor—the circumstances of which deserve a second look, including an examination of the role that was played in the election by the U.S. Attorney’s Office. At the time of her election in 2014, the incumbent mayor—a longtime councilman from the 7th Ward, Vincent Gray—was campaigning for reelection under a cloud of suspicion emanating from corruption charges brought against his aides by the U.S. Attorney’s office. A week before the 2014 Democratic primary (which would inevitably decide the outcome in November), U.S. Attorney Ron Machen stood before reporters and insinuated that charges against Gray would be forthcoming. Yet after the election, with Bowser safely in the mayor’s office, the four-year investigation that tarnished Gray’s reputation was conveniently dropped. Needless to say, the role the U.S. attorney’s office played in putting its hand on the scale during the election has never been properly investigated. That aside, 10 years of Bowser has been 10 too many. In both 2021 and 2022, the District clocked in with over 200 homicides. Yet last year was among the most violent the city had seen in a generation. By the end of 2023, homicides climbed nearly 40 percent over the previous year, while robberies were up 66 percent, and car thefts and carjackings were both up well north of 100 percent. The former Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) chief Robert Contee has noted that “the average homicide suspect has been arrested eleven times prior to them committing a homicide.” The Council’s answer to this was to pass a so-called “crime bill” that, according to a report published by the Heritage Foundation, would have “eliminated mandatory minimum penalties for every crime except first-degree murder; reduced the penalties for most crimes (including first-degree murder); and expanded the already hotly debated ability of violent felons to be released from prison early.” As The American Conservative’s managing editor Jude Russo observed, “The only conclusion a reasonable person could draw is that the members of the D.C. City Council actively and passionately hate their constituents, the poorest of whom bear the brunt of the city’s descent into bare savagery.” When not fighting crime, the Bowser administration has kept busy installing punitive speed traps and funds a parking enforcement regime that patrols the wealthier sections of Northwest with Stasi-like efficiency. You see, in Bowser’s Washington, some of the laws are enforced on some of the people some of the time; it simply depends which group finds itself in or out of favor with the rulers in the Wilson building. Fail to make a complete stop at a stop sign on a little-trafficked street in Northwest? Expect a ticket in the mail, ASAP. Jump a turnstile? Not a worry, have a nice day. Here illegally? No problem, we’re a “sanctuary city.” Would you care to vote in our elections? Matters have been exacerbated by the behavior of the U.S. Attorney’s office under one Matthew Graves. Because D.C. is a federal district, the U.S. Attorney’s office effectively pulls double duty as the federal and local prosecuting attorney’s office. The results under Graves have been abysmal. According to MPD’s Contee, “We believe every person we arrest should be off the streets.” Yet Graves, busy prosecuting January 6 rioters under rather novel interpretations of Sarbanes-Oxley, clearly disagrees—his office has declined to prosecute 67 percent of cases brought to his office by the MPD. Even the Washington Post was obliged to admit, a 67 percent declination rate is high. For example, in Wayne County, Mich., which includes Detroit, the prosecutor’s office reported declining 33 percent of its cases last year. Prosecutors in Philadelphia declined 4 percent and prosecutors in Cook County, Ill., which includes Chicago, declined 14 percent, according to data from those offices. This summer Graves declined to prosecute 22-year-old Kayla Kenisha Brown, who killed the 55-year-old woman she carjacked from a hospital parking lot when she crashed into the building that houses—wait for it—the U.S. Attorney’s office. Some in Congress have had enough. Last year, Congressmen Andy Ogles (R-TN), Matt Rosendale (R-MT) and Byron Donalds (R-FL) introduced a bill in the House that would repeal the D.C. Home Rule Act of 1973. Still more, D.C.’s governance problem has attracted the attention of the president-elect who, while on the campaign trail, repeatedly signaled his intent to deal with the mess Bowser and Graves have made. “We will take over the horribly run capital of our nation,” claimed Trump at a rally over the summer. “We’re going to take it away from the mayor. And again, that doesn’t make me popular there, but I have to say it.” Mr. President-elect, it is time to keep that promise: fire Matthew Graves and reassert federal control over Bowser’s Washington. The post Mr. President-Elect: Save The District From Itself appeared first on The American Conservative.

"It swept the country..." The post Ohio Players: What is the murderous scream heard on ‘Love Rollercoaster’? first appeared on Far Out Magazine.

Since World War II, American presidents have made some disastrous decisions taking the nation into pointless wars: George W. Bush’s search for nonexistent weapons of mass destructions in Iraq or LBJ’s major expansion of United States involvement in Vietnam being two of the worst. Eighty years ago, another president was faced with just such a critical step when the French government asked for United States help in its ongoing war to defeat Ho Chi Minh Communist forces in Vietnam. This time, the president said no. By early 1954, France had been in an almost decade-long unsuccessful effort to regain control of its former colony in Vietnam. Despite an army of 500,000 troops in Vietnam, they found themselves in a desperate battle in Dien Bien Phu surrounded by Ho’s forces led by his best general, General Giap. The United States beginning with President Truman had supplied the French with over $200 million in military aid with little to show for the effort. In early 1954, the French appealed for a major escalation of American military support. The Joint Chiefs of Staff led by Admiral Arthur Radford and General Nathan Twining of the Air Force came up with a plan of support. Called Operation Vulture, it called for 60 B-29 bombers stationed in the Philippines backed up with planes from two aircraft carriers to bomb Ho’s forces. There was even talk of using two or three tactical atomic weapons. A Pentagon study argued that “if properly employed” such action singlehandedly would win the war for the French. General Matthew Ridgway, chief of staff for the Army, argued vehemently against any such operation as an invitation to an open-ended conflict. Eisenhower, who admired Ridgway for his role in World War II and especially his handling of the Korean War, was impressed by his arguments. There the matter stood when it reached President Eisenhower’s desk in the spring of 1954. Eisenhower’s actions in the crisis are a classic example of what the late presidential historian Fred Greenstein called Ike’s “hidden hand” approach to the presidency. Eisenhower’s experience in World War II where he led the largest coalition Army in history made him cautious when it came to major military operations. His handling of this potential quagmire is a textbook case of not allowing circumstances to control events. When the matter came before the Cabinet and later in discussions with a smaller group of advisers both military and civilian, Eisenhower expressed sympathy for France’s plight. However, he insisted that nothing could or should be done unless three conditions were met: the French would have to recognize the independence of Vietnam, he must have the active support of the British, along with strong congressional approval. He knew none of these were likely to be met. Certainly, the French had no intention of withdrawing from Indochina at that time. Despite claims that Eisenhower was naive or innocent politically or diplomatically, he had a long experience in resolving or dealing with just such complex matters in the past. As he once noted, he studied acting under General Douglas MacArthur for almost a decade. None of Eisenhower’s criteria for action were met. Eisenhower wrote to Churchill, then serving the last years of his second premiership, and asked if Britain would join in and support American intervention in the Vietnam conflict. He knew what to expect and he got it. Britain, just recovering from a long conflict against Communist guerrillas in its colony in the Malay Peninsula, was less than a decade from a messy withdrawal from India. Britain had no interest in another Asian conflict. Congress then led by the Democrats was equally unenthusiastic, especially the newly elected leader of the Senate, Lyndon Baines Johnson. The Democrats remembered how they had been blamed for the “loss of China” and their conduct during the Korean War and wanted no part of helping Eisenhower in resolving the Indochina problem. Johnson failed to remember the lesson of 1954. Despite pressure from the French, and his own military advisers along with some prominent Republican political figures including Vice President Richard Nixon, Eisenhower rejected aiding the French. His reasoning is a textbook case of managing a crisis. Although Eisenhower had first employed the concept of the “domino theory” with regard to Indochina, in June he argued that Vietnam was devoid of military significance for the United States and the West in general. He was “bitterly opposed” he said to helping the French as military intervention would absorb division after division of American forces to no good end. The Pentagon plan had talked of seven U.S. divisions being possibly employed in Vietnam. (That was two more than the United States used in Korea.) It was out of the question. Eisenhower also was bothered by the racial aspect of the conflict. The use of atomic bombs he found outrageous. He told the military that it was “crazy” to want to use atomic weapons. “We can’t use those awful things against Asians for the second time in less than ten years. My God.” Dien Bien Phu fell in May, and the United States escaped a disastrous intervention in what eventually became an unwinnable conflict. The United States sent 800 civilian advisers to South Vietnam during the last four years of Eisenhower’s administration. Four died there. Eleven years later in July 1965, Lyndon Johnson took the fateful decision to escalate our involvement in Vietnam. He tried to elicit endorsement from Eisenhower that it was the right move, but he never got it. Eisenhower had learned the lesson of Vietnam, Johnson didn’t and it cost the United States 58,000 lives and the soul of the American nation deeply. John P. Rossi is Professor Emeritus of History at La Salle University in Philadelphia. The post When Ike Said No appeared first on The American Spectator | USA News and Politics.

The 2024 election results were a boon to Republicans nationwide and, in no small part, thanks to Pennsylvania. President-elect Trump and Senator-elect Dave McCormick won the state of Pennsylvania despite not winning Philadelphia County. However, the GOP still secured a victory in the Democratic city of brotherly love that resembled Republican wins across the country. Republican challenger Joe Picozzi defeated incumbent Democrat state Sen. Jimmy Dillon by a slim margin — 50.5 percent to 49.5 percent — for Pennsylvania’s 5th district located in Philadelphia’s northeast suburb. It marks the first time in almost 30 years that a Republican has won a state Senate seat in the region. Picozzi, 29, is an Eagle Scout, a graduate of Georgetown University, and the son of a Philadelphia firefighter. Despite being a novice to the campaign side of politics, Picozzi worked a short stint as a scheduler for former Speaker Kevin McCarthy while attending Georgetown. His credentials as a millennial Republican with TikTok influence earned him support from the state GOP but no official endorsement from the Philadelphia Republicans. Democrats outnumber Republicans two-to-one in terms of registered voters, but that didn’t stop Senate President Kim Ward from endorsing him and the Pennsylvania Senate Republican Campaign Committee from supporting him with $700,000 in contributions, according to the campaign finance audits. Despite the odds, Picozzi’s grassroots campaign, which zeroed in on crime as the primary issue, made a significant impact. His team knocked on over 70,000 doors and engaged with thousands of voters, discussing solutions for public safety and standard conservative approaches to law and order. This local initiative proved to be a game-changer. Democrats did not take Picozzi seriously as a candidate, which hurt them in the end. Democrats spent only $254,000 on the campaign, most of that during the final weeks. One Democrat told The Philadelphia Inquirer that this was the “most embarrassing” loss of the 2024 election cycle. Senator-elect Picozzi’s win keeps Pennsylvania Senate Republicans in control with a six-seat majority. It has broader implications for the city at large though. Picozzi’s deputy campaign manager, Sonny Mazzone, spoke of the importance of this campaign, stating it has “potential for a new chapter in Philadelphia.” It should also signal the potential for the GOP to start investing in races in urban cities and running younger movement conservatives now that Democrats are in the wilderness after their 2024 election loss. If Republicans can win races in Philadelphia, they can win anywhere. READ MORE from Alex Adkins: Do Republicans Have a Problem in Nebraska? Montana Might Be the Only Flip for Senate Republicans The post A Republican Wins in Philadelphia! appeared first on The American Spectator | USA News and Politics.

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